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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyzes the economic and political impacts of the recent influx of Chinese outward 
foreign direct investment (OFDI) into the European Union (EU). I consider the ways in which EU 
perceptions of Chinese OFDI have evolved over the course of the past decade as well as what 
attempts the EU has made at an institutional level to address challenges posed by Chinese 
investment. I contend that despite institutional efforts to respond to these perceived 
challenges – namely losing a technological edge, security concerns, and unreciprocated market 
access – Chinese OFDI in the EU has had a divisive effect. Not only has Chinese OFDI 
exacerbated economic cleavages within the bloc, but China has parlayed its economic 
relationship with many smaller EU member states into political leverage.  
 
 
Keywords: China, EU, FDI, investment screening, security, political influence
   
  1 
Table of Contents 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………………………….. 2 
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 3 
Chapter I – Chinese OFDI Trends in the EU…………………………………………………….. 8 
Chapter II – China’s Investment Motivations………………………………………………… 17 
i. Going Global…………………………………………………………………………………18 
ii. The Role of SOEs……………………………………………………………………………25 
iii. Investment Cooldown…………………………………………………………………….28 
Chapter III – EU Institutional Pushback Against Chinese OFDI………………………. 32 
i. Evolving Perceptions of Chinese OFDI………………………………………………. 33 
ii. Fears of Losing Technological Superiority……………………………………………40 
iii. An Unfair Playing Field……………………………………………………………………42 
iv. Security Concerns………………………………………………………………………….44 
v. Toward a Bilateral Investment Treaty………………………………………………. 46 
vi. FDI Screening……………………………………………………………………………….48 
Chapter IV – Economic Cleavages in the EU…………………………………………………. 52 
i. The Roots of the EU’s Economic Cleavages……………………………………….. 53 
ii. China’s Influence over Foreign Investment Review…………………………….. 60 
iii. Fractured Response to BRI………………………………………………………………65 
Chapter V – From Economic to Political Influence…………………………………………72 
i. An Ally to Eurosceptical and Illiberal Leaders………………………………………72 
ii. The Dalai Lama Question………………………………………………………………..76 
iii. A Lack of Consensus………………………………………………………………………77 
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………………………………….87 
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………………………….93 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 2 
Acknowledgements 
 
First and foremost, I would like to thank my family for their encouragement during the entire 
thesis process. Both from afar this Fall and at home this Spring I could count on you to help me 
through the ups and downs of an all-consuming project of this nature. I would also like to thank 
you for all that you’ve done to help me get to this point in my life; I would never have had the 
opportunity to write this thesis without your unwavering support throughout my academic 
journey.  
 
I would like to thank Professor Appel for all of her guidance over the past year. It was your IPE 
class that first got me interested in many of the topics explored in my thesis, and it was with 
your suggestions that those topics found a meaningful form.  
 
Thank you also to Professor Pei for offering me his input and his China expertise. 
 
Thank you to the EU Center at Scripps, and to Agnieszka Lazorczyk and Professor Andrews in 
particular, for providing the resources to help me develop my passion for European studies.  
 
Finally, thank you to all my friends. Thank you in particular to Luke Scanlan, Adam Singer, 
Walker Quinn, Tyler Chen, Jocelyn Crawford, Grace Kelleher, and of course the CMS Men’s 
Soccer team for all the moral support as well as the much-needed and frequent distractions. It’s 
unfortunate not to be celebrating our collective accomplishments together, but I’m forever 
grateful for the support and the fun times over the past four years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Introduction 
 
 
 The rise of China, as an economic, political, and military power, has become a primary 
focus of the international community over the past two decades. The spotlight on China is 
understandable, given its unprecedented transformation from a poor, communist, and highly 
agrarian country to the world’s largest economy – in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms – in 
the span of only forty years. In fact, it is China’s economic growth – which the World Bank 
dubbed “the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history”1 – that has turned 
heads across the globe. While China’s economic ascendancy has been impressive in and of 
itself, the nature of China’s dramatic turnaround is equally as remarkable. The economic 
reforms that started under Deng Xiaoping flew in the face of the orthodox policy prescriptions 
trumpeted by the West. Instead, China has taken a hybrid approach to economic development, 
combining the power of local entrepreneurship with heavy-handed state planning to great 
effect.  
 For years, Western countries welcomed China into the international fold, despite the 
persistence of a nominally communist government and a heterodox approach to economic 
development. There was a pervasive current of thought that China’s mixed economic system 
was a temporary step in the inevitable process of full liberalization; as China grew more 
prosperous it would slowly conform to the Western rules-based order. China has indeed grown 
more prosperous, but prosperity has not ushered in the sort of economic and political reforms 
                                                        
1 “The World Bank in China,” World Bank, accessed March 24, 2020, 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/testpagecheck. 
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that many Western leaders had hoped for. Rather, China has shown its ambitions to become a 
world superpower, transitioning from a rule taker to a rule maker. Consequentially, Western 
leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have looked upon Beijing’s model of capitalism with 
Chinese characteristics more critically. The same economic policies that have yielded 
tremendous growth within China have been increasingly perceived as tools of economic 
statecraft that often work to the detriment of everyone else. 
In the US, much of the conversation about Chinese economic statecraft has revolved 
around trade, and in particular, the US’s trade deficit with China. Starting with Bill Clinton in 
1994, US leaders have consistently identified China as, if not openly accused them of, being 
currency manipulators to keep the renminbi artificially undervalued.2 In recent years the issue 
has become more contentious with President Trump taking a brasher line against Beijing and 
instigating a “trade war” of retaliatory tariffs. In Europe, while trade relations with China 
continue to be a main concern of the European Union (EU), a new facet of the bloc’s economic 
relationship with China has gained prominence in national and supranational conversations: 
foreign direct investment (FDI).  
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), FDI 
is defined as “a category of cross-border investment made by a resident in one economy (the 
direct investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise that is 
resident in an economy other than that of the direct investor.”3 It can be difficult to measure 
                                                        
2 Brad Sester, “How Not to Fight a Currency War,” Foreign Affairs, August 28, 2019, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-08-28/how-not-fight-currency-war. 
3 “OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment” (OECD Publishing, 2008), 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investmentstatisticsandanalysis/40193734.pdf. 
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what investments are and are not encompassed by the term FDI, as evidenced by the OECD’s 
254-page benchmark definition of FDI, but broadly speaking FDI takes two forms. Foreign firms 
may acquire an enterprise or a controlling share of an enterprise in the host country, known as 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A), or foreign firms may directly establish business operations in 
the host country, which is referred to as greenfield investment. Importantly, portfolio 
investments are not considered FDI.  
Outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) from China may appear to be a relatively 
uncontroversial issue, yet it is anything but. On a broader level, receiving FDI from any country 
is both an economically and politically challenging prospect. While there are undoubtedly 
benefits to hosting FDI, such as increased economic activity in the host country, greater levels 
of trade with the country of investment origin, and possible gains in innovation and human 
capital, these benefits must be considered along with potential drawbacks, namely the 
crowding out of domestic investment, negative influence on exchange rates, and loss of control 
of key industries. This calculus has become particularly important when considering OFDI from 
China. As China has extended its FDI footprint around the world, especially under the umbrella 
of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), their intentions as well as the quality and implications of 
the investments have been called into question.  
While the EU, which is the world’s second largest economy in both nominal and PPP 
terms, has not traditionally been at the center of China’s plans to expand its outward 
investment, it now finds that it too must reckon with the advent of Chinese OFDI. And though 
the 27-member bloc of countries does not face the same set of challenges in addressing the 
inrush of Chinese capital as do many smaller, less-developed nations in Southeast Asia and 
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Africa, significant challenges exist nonetheless. These challenges cut across economics, politics, 
and security, and are forcing the EU to grapple with questions concerning its collective identity 
and ability to balance priorities. In short, Chinese OFDI already has, and will continue to have, a 
significant impact on the EU.  
Whereas there is a large body of work addressing general China-EU relations, academic 
work investigating the impact of Chinese OFDI in the EU is less robust. The majority of China-EU 
research examines the evolving nature of the EU and China’s relationship vis-à-vis a number of 
subject areas, such as the environment, security, governance, and commercial relations. Even 
within the subset of literature that focuses specifically on Chinese OFDI in the EU there is a 
relative dearth of work addressing how Chinese investment practices are reshaping EU-China 
relations and intra-EU relations in particular. For example, a number of authors consider 
Chinese OFDI practices from a business perspective, explaining investment rationale and trying 
to predict what factors motivate Chinese firms to move operations abroad.4 Others, notably 
Thilo Hanemann,5 have kept their analysis to a quantitative level without exploring the 
ramifications of increased Chinese FDI in depth.  
There are, however, a number of academic articles that have begun to delve into the 
political dimension of hosting Chinese FDI in the EU. Sophie Meunier has been the most prolific 
writer in this field, publishing a succession of articles assessing the political repercussions of 
                                                        
4 See, for example: Xiaoxi Zhang and Kevin Daly, “The Determinants of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment,” 
Emerging Markets Review 12, no. 4 (December 2011): 389–98, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ememar.2011.06.001; 
Xueli Huang and Chi Renyong, “Chinese Private Firms’ Outward Foreign Direct Investment: Does Firm Ownership 
and Size Matter?,” Thunderbird International Business Review 56, no. 5 (2014): 393–406, 
https://doi.org/10.1002/tie.21629. 
5 Thilo Hanemann, “Chinese Direct Investment in the EU and the US: A Comparative View,” Asia Europe Journal 12, 
no. 1 (March 1, 2014): 127–42, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-014-0379-5. 
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Chinese OFDI in the EU. Articles from Nicolas6 as well as Knoerich and Miedtank7 have also 
considered bloc-wide implications of Chinese OFDI. Other authors have focused specifically on 
Chinese OFDI in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries,8 BRI investment across the bloc,9 
or the EU’s regulatory policies in response to Chinese investment.10  
Outside of academia, there is no short supply of commentary on Chinese OFDI in the EU 
originating from think tanks and journalists. The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), 
Bruegel, and a number of smaller national or regional think tanks have pushed out commentary 
and reports on Chinese investment practices, while The Guardian, The Financial Times, The New 
York Times and The Economist have all covered the topic to varying degrees. The greater 
amount of coverage that Chinese OFDI in the EU has received by think tanks and the media is in 
part a reflection of the novel and highly dynamic nature of these investments; in the past 
decade the Chinese OFDI landscape has shifted considerably. As such, this thesis looks to add to 
the limited literature surrounding Chinese OFDI in the EU, paying particular attention to how 
Chinese investment is altering the EU’s internal dynamics.  
                                                        
6 Françoise Nicolas, “China’s Direct Investment in the European Union: Challenges and Policy Responses,” China 
Economic Journal 7, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 103–25, https://doi.org/10.1080/17538963.2013.874070. 
7 Jan Knoerich and Tina Miedtank, “The Idiosyncratic Nature of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Europe,” 
CESIFO Forum 19, no. 4 (December 2018): 3–8. 
8 See, for example: Wade Jacoby, “Different Cases, Different Faces: Chinese Investment in Central and Eastern 
Europe,” Asia Europe Journal 12, no. 1 (March 1, 2014): 199–214, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-014-0380-z; 
Ágnes Szunomár and Agnieszka McCaleb, “Chinese and Other East Asian Foreign Direct Investment in Central and 
Eastern Europe: Motives, Location Choices and Employment Approaches,” CESIFO Forum 19, no. 4 (December 
2018): 9–14. 
9 Zuokui Liu, “Europe’s Protectionist Position on the Belt and Road Initiative and Its Influence,” China International 
Studies 72 (2018): 145–65. 
10 Haiyan Zhang and Daniel Van Den Bulcke, “China’s Direct Investment in the European Union: A New Regulatory 
Challenge?,” Asia Europe Journal 12, no. 1/2 (March 2014): 159–77, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-014-0383-9; 
Frank Bickenbach and Wan-Hsin Liu, “Chinese Direct Investment in Europe – Challenges for EU FDI Policy,” CESIFO 
Forum 19, no. 4 (December 2018): 15–23. 
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Specifically, Chapter I will outline the trends in Chinese OFDI in the EU, paying particular 
attention to investment volume, the geographical distribution of investment, and what form 
Chinese investment tends to take. Chapter II will then contextualize these investment trends by 
examining Chinese motivations for investing in the EU. This chapter will consider business 
investment literature as well as the historical and political circumstances in both China and the 
EU that help account for the unique trends in Chinese OFDI in the EU. Chapter III will then turn 
to how the EU has reacted to the influx of Chinese OFDI at an institutional level. In particular, 
this chapter will focus on the specific challenges that Chinese OFDI poses to the bloc and what 
efforts the EU has made to address them. Chapter IV will examine the differences in member 
state opinion toward the challenges and benefits of Chinese OFDI, demonstrating how 
increased levels of investment have deepened economic cleavages in the bloc. Finally, chapter 
V will then consider how Chinese OFDI has not only harmed the economic cohesiveness of the 
EU but its political cohesiveness as well.   
 
 
Chapter I – Chinese OFDI Trends in the EU 
 
 
The rise in Chinese OFDI into the EU over the past decade has been truly remarkable. 
Prior to the global financial crisis (GFC), which mired most of the Eurozone in economic 
stagnation, China’s level of investment in the EU was negligible. In fact, from 2004 to 2008, 
Chinese OFDI in Europe totaled less than $1 billion annually. However, in the wake of the crisis, 
Chinese investment into the EU tripled, as roughly $3 billion entered the EU from China in both 
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2009 and 2010.11 This explosion of investment continued into the next decade, with inflows 
again tripling by 2012 and eventually peaking at $41 billion in 2016.12  
 
 
 
Interestingly, Chinese OFDI in the EU has been in sharp decline since 2016. From 2016 to 
2017 Chinese investment dropped from $41 billion to $32.1 billion. 2018 saw a similar decrease 
in Chinese investment, representing the lowest level of investment since 2014 and over a 50% 
decrease in investment from 2016.13 Though full data are not yet available, similarly low levels 
                                                        
11 Sophie Meunier, “‘Beggars Can’t Be Choosers’: The European Crisis and Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in the 
European Union,” Journal of European Integration 36, no. 3 (2014): 283-302. 
12 Thilo Hanemann, Mikko Huotari, and Agatha Kratz, “Chinese FDI in Europe: 2018 Trends and Impact of New 
Screening Policies” (Rhodium Group and Mercator Institute for China Studies, March 2019), https://rhg.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/RHG-MERICS-COFDI-Update-2019.pdf. 
13 Ibid. 
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of Chinese OFDI in the EU are expected in 2019. Not only has Chinese OFDI into the EU been 
decreasing in the past few years, but China divested over $4 billion worth of European assets 
since 2016.14 Despite the recent pullback in Chinese investment into the EU, China remains a 
significant source of investment for the EU as a whole. The United States, Canada, and 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries such as Switzerland and Norway have 
consistently accounted for the majority of OFDI into the EU, but since 2007 China has solidified 
itself as a top investor in the region. A working document from the European Commission 
found that China controls approximately 28,000 EU-based firms and 1.6% of the assets of EU-
based firms. This represents a significant increase from a decade earlier, when China controlled 
only 5,000 firms and .6% of assets.15  
China has turned heads as an investor in the EU not only because of the huge increase in 
quantity of investment in a short timeframe, but because of the character of Chinese 
investment. Compared to investment from other countries, a large proportion of Chinese 
investment is made by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The EU classifies SOEs as firms with at 
least 20% government ownership, but this cut-off may not accurately capture the extent of 
state-backed investment in the EU; it is often difficult to determine the level of government 
involvement in many Chinese firms and therefore to what extent these firms are under 
influence from the state. Using the formal definition of a SOE, the EU estimates that since 2000, 
over 60% of all Chinese OFDI in the EU originated from these government-backed enterprises.16 
                                                        
14Ibid. 
15 European Commission, “Commission Staff Working Document on Foreign Direct Investment in the EU,” Working 
Document (Brussels, March 13, 2019), https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/march/tradoc_157724.pdf. 
16 Ibid. 
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Chinese SOEs’ share of investment peaked in the early 2010s, when upwards of 75% of all 
investment was made by SOEs. While this share has decreased to 41% in 2018, the SOE share of 
investment is still unusually large compared to other regions investing in the EU.17 In fact, in 
2017, only EFTA countries saw a larger share of their OFDI into Europe originate from SOEs.18  
 
 
 
 Around 95% of Chinese SOE investment in the EU takes the form of mergers and 
acquisitions. This preference for M&A rather than greenfield investment has been fairly 
consistent in the past decade, as Chinese firms have looked to capitalize on existing firm 
                                                        
17 Hanemann, Huotari, and Kratz, “Chinese FDI in Europe: 2018 Trends and Impact of New Screening Policies.” 
18 European Commission, “Commission Staff Working Document on Foreign Direct Investment in the EU.” 
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infrastructure and knowhow.19 Noticeably, Chinese SOE investment in the EU is concentrated in 
a handful of strategic sectors, such as utilities, machinery, and transportation services and 
infrastructure. As the European Commission highlights, this concentration of investment is 
driven primarily by a number of mega-deals within those sectors by some of China’s largest 
SOEs, such as China Investment Corporation (CIC), Three Gorges, State Grid, and ChemChina.20 
When broadening the scope of Chinese OFDI to include private investment, a similar preference 
for M&A investments rather than greenfield projects is evident, but there is less of a sectoral 
focus on utilities, machinery, and transportation. Once again, in previous years, the prevalence 
of mega-deals, such as Tencent Gaming’s $8.6 billion acquisition of Supercell, 
disproportionately weights investment in certain sectors.21 In 2018 however, due in part to a 
lack of mega-deals, no single sector accounted for more than 20% of total Chinese 
investment.22 Increased investment in biotech, health, and business and financial services 
contributed to this industry diversification of investment as well.  
Though all EU member states have been recipients of Chinese OFDI, the geographic 
distribution of investment has been very uneven. The large economies of Western Europe have 
received the largest share of Chinese investment, with the UK leading the way at approximately 
$51.5 billion transacted since 2000.23 Germany and France, who round out the “Big Three” 
economies, have consistently been favorite destinations for Chinese OFDI. In recent years 
investment in the Benelux countries and Northern Europe has increased. Investment in 
                                                        
19 Knoerich and Miedtank, “The Idiosyncratic Nature of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Europe.” 
20 European Commission, “Commission Staff Working Document on Foreign Direct Investment in the EU.” 
21 Andre Tartar, Mira Rojanasakul, and Jeremy Scott Diamond, “How China Is Buying Its Way Into Europe,” 
Bloomberg.com, April 23, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-china-business-in-europe/. 
22 Hanemann, Huotari, and Kratz, “Chinese FDI in Europe: 2018 Trends and Impact of New Screening Policies.” 
23 Tartar, Rojanasakul, and Jeremy Scott Diamond, “How China Is Buying Its Way Into Europe.” 
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Southern and Mediterranean Europe has fallen to under 15% of total Chinese OFDI in the EU, 
well below its peak of around 40% of investment in the years 2012-2015. Central and Eastern 
Europe has seen the lowest levels of Chinese OFDI, not accounting for more than 5% of 
investment into the EU in any given year since 2013.24 Despite the low level of overall Chinese 
investment in CEE countries, greenfield investment in the region has actually seen an uptick. 
Chinese firms have invested in the construction of solar farms in both Hungary and The Czech 
Republic as well as an automotive R&D center in Austria and a manufacturing plant in Poland.25  
Chinese regional investment patterns may seem intuitive, given the size of the 
economies that comprise each region. China is investing most heavily in the larger, more 
developed economies of Western and Northern Europe. However, the volume of Chinese OFDI 
has not always been proportional to the size of the recipient economy. When taking into 
consideration the 2018 GDP of each member state in addition to the volume of Chinese 
investment into each economy, it is clear that certain countries have received a 
disproportionate amount of Chinese investment. For example, though Malta has only received 
.5% of all Chinese OFDI into the EU since 2000, the roughly $880 million worth of investment 
from China is equal to just over 6% of the country’s 2018 GDP. Conversely, though Germany has 
received roughly $24.4 billion in Chinese investment since 2000 (14.6% of all Chinese OFDI into 
the EU during that period), this total is equivalent to only .56% of Germany’s 2018 GDP.  
                                                        
24 Hanemann, Huotari, and Kratz, “Chinese FDI in Europe: 2018 Trends and Impact of New Screening Policies.” 
25 Szunomár and McCaleb, “Chinese and Other East Asian Foreign Direct Investment in Central and Eastern Europe: 
Motives, Location Choices and Employment Approaches.” 
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Table 1 - 10 Largest EU Recipients of Chinese OFDI Measured as a Share of Their 2018 GDP (Data Source: Rhodium Group) 
 
The ten EU member states who received the most Chinese OFDI as a share of their 2018 
GDP are quite diverse, economically and geographically. Five are advanced economies in 
Western and Northern Europe, two are small Mediterranean island nations, two are medium-
sized Southern European economies, and one is located in Central Europe. The type of Chinese 
investment made into each country is not identical. Notably, most Chinese investment in 
Luxembourg has been in financial services or what the IMF would classify as “phantom FDI” – 
investment into shell companies in tax havens.26 On the other hand, Chinese investment in 
Greece has been focused in the energy and shipping sectors, most remarkably China Ocean 
Shipping Company’s (COSCO) purchase of the Port of Piraeus in 2009. 
One form of Chinese OFDI that has garnered significant attention from governments and 
political commentators alike is BRI investment. Launched in 2013, BRI is a sweeping and 
                                                        
26 Jannick Damgaard, Thomas Elkjaer, and Niels Johannesen, “The Rise of Phantom Investments,” Finance & 
Development (IMF) 56, no. 3 (September 2019): 11-13. 
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ambitious foreign policy project that Chinese President Xi Jinping has lauded as “the project of 
the century.”27 Substantively, BRI looks to leverage China’s unrivaled capabilities in construction 
to undertake huge infrastructure and connectivity projects across the globe. Most of China’s 
BRI investment has been focused in Southeast Asia, but in recent years, Africa, Central Asia, 
Latin America, and Europe have all seen an uptick in BRI-related investment. The initiative has 
received an enormous amount of attention, in large part do the ambiguity inherent in Xi’s 
signature project. The lofty language in which BRI is couched, such as being labeled “the 
integration of spiritual and material human abilities to understand the world, change the world, 
and profoundly shape the destiny of humanity,” by Chinese policy advisers at Tsinghua 
University, does little to disentangle the initiative’s true intentions.28 
 The ambiguity surrounding BRI and what does or does not count as a BRI project make 
measuring its presence in the EU difficult. Indeed, there is no official list of BRI projects 
currently underway in the EU, despite the fact that the majority of EU member states have 
signed non-binding Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with China regarding the initiative. 
Thus, estimations of the quantity of BRI investment in the EU varies according to the analyst. 
For example, The Mercator Institute for China Studies’ (MERICS) BRI database includes all 
investments valued at $25 million or greater that further BRI policy goals, whether or not they 
receive the official BRI rubber stamp. The American Enterprise Institute’s (AEI) China Global 
Investment Tracker uses slightly different criteria, considering all infrastructure investment in 
                                                        
27 Yuen Yuen Ang, “Demystifying Belt and Road,” Foreign Affairs, May 22, 2019, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-05-22/demystifying-belt-and-road. 
28 Angang Hu and Xin Zhang, “‘Belt and Road’: A Century Project to Build a Blessing for All,” China Daily, May 2017, 
http://china.chinadaily.com.cn/2017-05/16/content_29371140.htm. 
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EU member states that China recognizes to be part of BRI (even if the host country does not 
claim to be part of BRI) as BRI investment. One project that all parties, including the EU itself, 
agree constitutes a BRI project is the Belgrade-Budapest railway. Currently under construction, 
the nearly $3 billion project will first connect the Hungarian and Serbian capitals, before 
eventually being extended down to the Chinese-owned Port of Piraeus.29 Beyond this hallmark 
project, which investments should or should not be classified as BRI investment is disputed, 
though there seems to be consensus that the volume of BRI investment in Europe is still 
relatively low compared to other regions. 
In summary, Chinese OFDI in the EU over the past decade has been quite idiosyncratic. 
In the wake of the GFC, Chinese investment in the EU has increased significantly yet waned in 
recent years. Similarly, the SOE share of investment remains high, but has decreased noticeably 
since the peak years of the early 2010s. In terms of investment volume, most Chinese OFDI is 
directed towards the EU’s most robust economies, and the UK in particular, with the CEE region 
receiving the lowest share of investment. The assortment of member states that have received 
disproportionate shares of Chinese OFDI is much more varied, however. Furthermore, the 
effect of China’s BRI, announced seven years ago, has been difficult to gauge. There have been 
a number of high-profile Chinese-backed infrastructure projects in the EU, but it seems the 
initiative’s biggest impact has been to cause confusion and trepidation throughout the bloc.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
29 Wade Shepard, “Another Silk Road Fiasco? China’s Belgrade To Budapest High-Speed Rail Line Is Probed By 
Brussels,” Forbes, February 25, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2017/02/25/another-silk-road-
fiasco-chinas-belgrade-to-budapest-high-speed-rail-line-is-probed-by-brussels/. 
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Chapter II – China’s Investment Motivations 
 
 
While Chinese OFDI into the EU can be characterized as idiosyncratic, the patterns of 
investment volume, type, and location fall in line with China’s evolving geoeconomic strategies. 
A propitious investment environment in Europe following the GFC paired with a broader 
Chinese ambition to move production up the value chain contributed to the huge surge in 
Chinese OFDI into the EU.  
With the GFC miring most of the EU in an extended period of economic stagnation, 
many countries saw FDI as a key source of capital to jumpstart growth. Pervasive double-digit 
unemployment and fiscal frugality left governments cash-strapped. But because European 
banks responded to the crisis by holding onto assets and securing their balance sheets, capital 
was scarce within the EU itself.30 A lack of willing European investors and unfavorable short-
term economic prospects throughout the EU severely dampened investment demand.31 Not 
only did investment demand decrease, but the supply of investment opportunities sharply 
increased. A number of large infrastructure projects were opened to private bidders and in 
some cases heavily indebted governments were placed on privatization plans by bailout 
agencies. Such was the case in Greece and Portugal where everything from ports and railways 
to state owned airlines were put up for sale.32 The burgeoning supply of investment 
opportunities yet plummeting demand led to decreased valuations of European assets, 
                                                        
30 Meunier, “‘Beggars Can’t Be Choosers’: The European Crisis and Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in the 
European Union.” 
31 Jeremy Clegg and Hinrich Voss, “Chinese Overseas Direct Investment in the European Union” (London: ECRAN, 
2012), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Asia/0912ecran_cleggvoss.pdf. 
32 Meunier, “‘Beggars Can’t Be Choosers’: The European Crisis and Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in the 
European Union.” 
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essentially creating a litany of economic “bargain basement” opportunities.33 Chinese SOEs and 
private firms capitalized on the economic opportunities in the EU, snapping up real estate and 
undervalued European firms alike.  
 
Going Global 
 
The explosion of Chinese investment in the EU, however, cannot be solely attributed to 
naked opportunism in the wake of the GFC. The two and a half decades of blistering Chinese 
growth experienced after Mao Zedong’s death were due to extensive market-based reforms 
within China, yet the country remained a largely closed economy during this period. At the turn 
of the millennium China began changing tact, strategically reorienting its economy outward as 
part of its “go global” strategy. China acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, 
officially opening its economy to some competition and foreign investment. Of equal 
importance was Premier Rongji’s announcement of China’s tenth five-year plan in March of 
2001. Among the raft of strategic goals and economic reforms elucidated in the plan, Rongji 
recognized the importance of international integration and encouraged Chinese enterprises to 
“go outside.”34 Specifically, Rongji signaled that OFDI was an explicit policy goal by exhorting 
“enterprises with comparative advantages to make investments abroad, to establish processing 
operations, to exploit foreign resources with local partners, to contract for international 
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engineering projects, and to increase the export of labor.”35 The Chinese government did in fact 
change policy to facilitate outward investment by Chinese firms. Most notably, they relaxed 
outbound capital controls and streamlined approval procedures for firms looking to expand 
abroad.36  
The reasons for a change in Chinese attitude towards OFDI are multifaceted, and satisfy 
a variety of strategic goals. From a macroeconomic stability perspective, OFDI helped China 
solve a balance of payments conundrum. For years the state had amassed a wealth of foreign 
reserves, especially US treasury bonds, but wanted to avoid revaluing the renminbi.37 Outward 
investment went a long way to ease these upwards currency pressures. OFDI also assuaged 
trade tensions. WTO accession put Chinese growth tactics in the international limelight, and 
many countries accused China of flooding markets with cheap goods. Opening manufacturing 
facilities abroad was an easy remedy for these recurring frictions. For example, the appliance 
manufacturing conglomerate Haier Group opened production facilities in Europe and the 
United States to avoid quota restrictions, anti-dumping sanctions, and a general animus toward 
Chinese goods.38  
While avoiding anti-dumping sanctions and keeping the renminbi undervalued were 
important goals, China’s “go global” policy is above all else a strategy to move production up 
the global value chain. China relied on cheap labor and low-cost exports to drive much of its 
initial growth, but has recognized the importance of developing higher value-added industries 
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to spur on further growth.39 In short China does not want to simply import components for final 
product assembly, but create these products domestically. Doing so requires a confluence of 
factors, such as the acquisition of advanced technology and managerial knowhow, both of 
which are available in spades in European markets. In fact, China’s desire to acquire advanced 
technology and managerial knowhow in order to upgrade firm capacity helps explain why 
Europe has been a major destination for OFDI and why the vast majority of investment has 
taken the form of M&A.40 
Globally, the majority of FDI follows the pattern of firms from advanced economies 
expanding into countries with equally developed or less developed economies. The main 
motive is market-seeking, and firms will use their ownership advantages, such as superior 
technology, greater brand recognition, or managerial advantages, to do so.41 Much of China’s 
OFDI has followed this pattern, with the largest share of its OFDI being funneled into less 
developed Asian economies.42 But Chinese investment into the EU breaks from the paradigm. 
Chinese firms, both state-owned and private, are investing in more advanced economies as a 
form of strategic asset-seeking, most notably to acquire European technology and managerial 
prowess.43 
In terms of technology, the tenth five-year plan referenced both “enhancing traditional 
industries with high, new and advanced technologies,” as well as “developing new and high-
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tech industries” as key goals.44 Subsequent five years plan, and most recently Premier Li 
Keqiang’s “Made in China 2025” policy, have employed similar verbiage to describe Chinese 
ambitions in advanced technology as well. As a late developer, the task of rapidly building up 
advanced technological capacities has not been lost on the Chinese government. Indeed, China 
has realized that the quickest and least expensive way to acquire advanced technologies is to 
buy a company that owns this technology, rather than painstakingly, and perhaps illegally, try 
to develop it oneself.45 Thus, many Chinese firms have used investment in the EU as a form of 
strategic asset-seeking, looking to acquire and transfer new technological capabilities in order 
to address the technological weaknesses of Chinese firms.46 Some notable examples of Chinese 
attempts to facilitate technology transfers from European firms range from Midea’s acquisition 
of Kuka Robotics, China Investment Corporation’s (CIC) acquisition of NXP Semiconductors’ RF 
Power unit, and Wanhua’s acquisition of Borsod Chemical.47 Each of these deals was quite large 
(worth over $1B) and highlights the diversity of technological sectors into which Chinese firms 
have invested. 
Chinese strategic asset-seeking in the EU has not only targeted physical assets such as 
technologies, but also intangible assets like managerial knowhow and brand recognition. Many 
Chinese firms understand that much of the strategic value in acquiring a European firm is the 
“tacit tech knowhow and management skills embedded in European human capital,” not just 
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the tangible assets themselves.48 As such, Chinese firms often approach post-acquisition with a 
light-touch strategy, tending not to completely reorganize units or integrate European firms 
into the parent company. This technique stands in stark contrast with the approach of many 
other large Western firms who take a more hands-on approach post-acquisition.49 The results 
of this acquisition strategy is evident in the pattern of Chinese OFDI in the EU; the vast majority 
of Chinese OFDI in the EU takes the form of acquisitions whereas greenfield investment has 
consistently accounted for under 5% of yearly OFDI.50 
Chinese firms have also looked to capitalize on the international visibility of many major 
European brands as a way to build-up the popularity of Chinese brands. Despite the growth of 
many major Chinese brands in recent years, increasing international brand recognition, 
especially in consumer goods, still remains an area for improvement. Once again, the Chinese 
strategy has been to build off the brand reputation of respected European firms rather than 
develop brand reputation from scratch.51 The acquisition of Volvo, as well as apparel companies 
Robert Clergerie and Aquascutum are notable examples.52 Acquiring reputable European 
brands further benefits Chinese firms by enhancing their reputation in home markets, even 
introducing previously unpopular or unavailable European products to Chinese consumers.53 
Such has been the case with French wine. Chinese investors have sunk huge sums into buying 
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up vineyards in Bordeaux and Burgundy, driving up demand back home in the process.54 In 
essence, European brand acquisition provides a twofold bump in popularity for Chinese brands. 
Acquisitions of distinguished European brands provides a boost to Chinese firms abroad, 
especially those in the fashion or luxury goods sectors, by signaling their legitimacy and quality 
as international brands to Western consumers. Domestically, the impact of European brand 
acquisition is even greater, as it allows Chinese firms to introduce new, high quality goods to an 
increasingly affluent Chinese market.  
The concentration of high-tech firms and world-renowned brands in Western and 
Northern Europe may help explain why Chinese OFDI has been so focused in these regions. 
Firms are asset-seeking in the regions with the highest concentration of desired assets. But 
Chinese investment dynamics in CEE countries follow slightly different motives, and may fall 
more in line with traditional market-seeking behaviors. Though as previously mentioned, 
Chinese OFDI in CEE countries has been meager, China sees strategic investment opportunities 
in the region. First, Chinese firms see insertion into CEE markets as a way to gain access to the 
whole EU market, as well as the markets of EFTA member states. Perhaps more important is 
the fact that many CEE countries offer high-skill labor at lower cost than other Western and 
Northern European countries, making the establishment of in-country manufacturing facilities 
in the CEE region an attractive option.55 This is consistent with the observed characteristics of 
Chinese OFDI in the region. Greenfield investment constitutes a larger share of Chinese OFDI in 
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the CEE countries than elsewhere in the EU, in large part because Chinese firms have built 
manufacturing facilities in the region.56 Furthermore, Chinese firms see the establishment of 
production facilities in the CEE region as a way to avoid EU import barriers, and smooth over 
frustrations that accompany large trade imbalances.57  
While some of the aforementioned motivations can help account for Chinese 
predilections for investment in certain EU regions, they do little to explain variation in country-
level investment patterns. For example, Chinese OFDI in the CEE countries has been heavily 
concentrated in Visegrad countries (Hungary and Poland in particular), despite the fact that 
labor costs and corporate tax rates are lower in Romania and Bulgaria. Moreover, the countries 
in the most dire financial straits following the GFC, who offered up the lion’s share of “bargain 
basement” deals, did not receive the most Chinese OFDI. In fact, the state of each European 
economy was not a good indicator of Chinese investment volume and Chinese firms often did 
not acquire European assets at bargain prices.58 To better discern country-specific investment 
motivations, it seems that an understanding of bilateral relations between China and EU 
countries is fundamental. Beyond traditional domestic factors, such as quality of institutions 
and openness to investment, research indicates that there is evidence of a “strong link between 
the intensity of the two-way investment relationship between a member state and China and 
the propensity of Chinese firms to invest in the EU.”59 In other words, member states that have 
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cultivated an economic relationship with China are most likely to be the beneficiaries of 
Chinese OFDI.  
 
The Role of SOEs 
 
As previously noted, there is a distinction between Chinese OFDI originating from SOEs 
and private firms. The majority of Chinese OFDI in the EU since the turn of the millennium has 
originated from SOEs, though their share has significantly decreased in the past five years. The 
dominance of SOEs as sources of Chinese OFDI into the EU is unsurprising; SOEs have, until 
recently, enjoyed an extremely privileged position in the Chinese economy. In fact, the initial 
years of China’s “go global” policy were aimed specifically at promoting SOE expansion abroad. 
This is in part due to the fact that China’s original commercial expansion policies focused 
primarily on key strategic industries such as natural resource extraction, energy, and 
telecommunications – sectors in which many Chinese SOEs were uniquely positioned to take 
advantage.60 Indeed, SOEs continue to operate monopolies in many of these sectors. For 
example, the two largest Chinese enterprises are Sinopec and Chinese National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC), both of which are state-owned oil companies. Private firms find it 
impossible to compete with state-supported conglomerates, and in many cases were explicitly 
prohibited from competing with SOEs in strategic sectors, which limited possibilities for 
international expansion in the early 2000s.  
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Chinese policy did not only prioritize SOE-dominated sectors for foreign expansion, but 
actively supported SOE investment by providing financial support. Private enterprises faced a 
much more restrictive regulatory environment than their state-owned counterparts, making it 
difficult to acquire the necessary permits for outward investment.61 Furthermore, even if 
private firms did receive permission to invest abroad, they did not receive the same financial 
favoritism that SOEs enjoyed. SOEs often received loans at artificially low interest rates, were 
given soft budgets by the state, and were prioritized by national banks.62 Finally, because most 
private firms were relatively young and had no international experience, the prospect of 
investing abroad was daunting. Acquiring a company or launching a greenfield project requires 
technical expertise and managerial nous, neither of which was in abundant supply in Chinese 
firms in the early 2000s. Instead, these initial years of “going global”, which relied heavily on 
SOE investment, can be seen as China using country-specific advantages (financial support of 
SOEs and a favorable regulatory environment) as a way to develop more traditional ownership 
advantages.63 
In recent years, SOE investment has begun to account for a smaller share of all Chinese 
OFDI into the EU. One explanation for this decrease in SOE share of OFDI into the EU is 
diversification in which sectors are receiving investment. While the 10th five-year plan 
highlighted SOE-dominated strategic industries for concerted investment efforts, subsequent 
plans have expanded the scope of Chinese OFDI to a broader set of sectors.64 Many of these 
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sectors, such as manufacturing, entertainment, and business services, are highly competitive 
sectors in which private Chinese firms, rather than SOEs, are major players. Moreover, many EU 
firms are industry leaders in these sectors, making investment in the EU all the more attractive. 
Simply put, as Beijing has prioritized a broader range of industries for foreign investment, more 
private Chinese firms have jumped on the opportunity to invest abroad, and in the EU in 
particular.  
The decrease in SOE share of Chinese OFDI into the EU can also be seen as part of a 
deeper restructuring of the Chinese economy, one in which SOEs do not enjoy the same level 
privilege that they have since the Deng Xiaoping era. China’s growth over the past few decades 
has been truly remarkable, but President Xi has recognized the limitations of a growth model 
based on exports, infrastructure investment, and SOE dominance. China’s growth has slowed 
markedly in the past decade as efficiency gains have been hard to come by and debt has 
saddled the economy. One of Xi’s major reform policies has been to put SOEs on a more equal 
playing field with private firms.65 While SOEs still hold a privileged status, Xi has worked to 
eliminate some of the preferential treatment they receive from financial institutions.66 The 
same preferential treatment that has allowed SOEs to penetrate international markets, such as 
soft budgets, artificially low interest rates, and guaranteed monopoly positions, also prevents 
them from making significant efficiency gains.67 This last point is particularly important; 
because most Chinese SOEs face little to no market competition they have little incentive to 
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innovate. Indeed, China has recognized innovation and private entrepreneurship as important 
drivers of growth for the future, and in turn have looked to eliminate some of the structural 
disadvantages that private firms face vis-à-vis SOEs.  
 
Investment Cooldown  
 
The decrease in Chinese SOE share of investment in the EU should be seen as a 
consequence of increased levels of private firm investment, not of decreased levels of SOE 
investment. It appears that the combination of broader sectoral investment preferences and 
fewer barriers to OFDI for private firms has succeeded in promoting more private Chinese 
investment. Despite this sharp increase in the immediate aftermath of the GFC, the past two 
years have seen an equally sharp decrease in Chinese OFDI into the EU, with experts predicting 
similarly depressed levels of investment for 2019 and beyond. Once again, the explanation for 
this trend lies in China’s domestic economic policy.  
In recent years, China has reimplemented stricter capital controls to curb the amount of 
money leaving the country. Following years of liberalized outbound capital flows, President Xi 
Jinping has reined in both private and state-owned investment abroad. This tightening of 
capital controls is a reactionary measure meant to address a number of macroeconomic goals, 
including a desire to stabilize the renminbi and counteract a waning current account surplus.68 
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More specifically, it appears that Xi’s new capital controls are a direct reaction to what China 
perceives as capital flight during the years of the outward investment boom.  
Though it is hard to discern the true motives for private Chinese OFDI, according to a 
Baker McKenzie report, the Chinese government interpreted the upsurge in foreign investment 
as a desire to move capital out of China due to uncertain prospects for continued Chinese 
growth.69 The government has publicly cracked down on private firms such as Dalian Wanda, 
FOSUN, and the HNA group, telling banks not to finance deals and imploring these firms to 
invest domestically.70 This strategy has been met with varying degrees of success. Wang Jianlin 
– China’s richest man and Dalian Wanda’s CEO –  succumbed to the government’s pressure 
whereas Guo Guangchang, FOSUN’s CEO, has continued to aggressively pursue deals 
throughout Europe.71 The decline of Chinese OFDI in the EU indicates that pressure from the 
Chinese government has been successful in reeling in foreign investment overall.  
Finally, depressed investment levels in Europe may also be a reaction towards a stricter 
investment environment across the EU. As will be addressed in the following chapter, EU 
scrutiny over Chinese OFDI has increased in the past few years and a number of notable deals 
have been blocked by national authorities. As a Baker McKenzie report once again suggests, 
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trepidation towards new EU FDI regulations likely factors into the dip in Chinese OFDI in the 
EU.72 
All of the aforementioned trends in Chinese OFDI can be broadly understood as being 
economically motivated. The huge increase in Chinese investment and subsequent decrease in 
the past two years falls in line with policy dictated from Beijing; at first there was a push for 
loosened capital controls and asset-seeking investment, but as the 2010s wore on and capital 
was leaving China in abundance, President Xi backtracked and has reintroduced stricter capital 
controls. SOEs were the vanguards of foreign investment, but the Chinese government has 
begun to level the playing field with private firms. The reason that the EU has seen such a boom 
of Chinese OFDI is in part due to the enticing economic opportunities present in the post-GFC 
landscape, and in part due to the composition of the EU market. The combination of European 
human capital and managerial knowhow, highly recognizable brands, and advanced 
technologies meant that the EU was replete with many of the strategic assets Chinese firms 
were seeking.   
The literature on Chinese investment dynamics in the EU makes little mention of 
political motives for Chinese investment. It should be noted that most economic policy 
decisions can be considered inherently political; state economic policy has redistributive effects 
and influences a country’s economic development. This is especially true in China, where a 
system of state capitalism further blurs the line between state development policy and private 
economic decision-making. However, there is very little discussion of Chinese investment as a 
tool to increase Chinese political power in academic literature.  
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It is only in recent years, especially with the increased visibility of BRI, that the potential 
political motivations for Chinese investment in the EU have suffused the China-EU investment 
discourse. A variety of commentators, ranging from think-tank fellows to journalists of major 
publications, have expressed concern about China’s growing influence in the EU, yet few go 
beyond questioning whether Chinese investment has strings attached or ulterior motives. For 
example, a 2018 Economist briefing questions how much of China’s EU investment can be 
chalked up to grand strategy ambitions, and a 2019 article from The Guardian asked if Europe 
knows the true price of China’s billions.73 Reports from the ECFR and Czech Association for 
International Affairs (AMO) considers the link between Chinese investment in CEE counties and 
increased political influence.74 And a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment, in a testimony 
before the US House of Representatives, claimed that Beijing was intentionally aiming to sow 
political divisions within the EU.75 
Unsurprisingly, official Chinese rhetoric towards OFDI in the EU makes no mention of 
political motivations and Chinese bureaucrats and scholars alike refute the narrative of Chinese 
investment being a tool for political gain.76 With such polarized perceptions of Chinese OFDI in 
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the EU, it will be very difficult to definitively determine to what extent political machinations 
have guided Chinese investment strategy in the region. However, the state-directed nature of 
many Chinese OFDI initiatives as well as the emergence of BRI and the 16+1 cooperation 
framework, which both aim to improve economic and political relations between China and EU 
member states, suggests that there are political motivations for investing in the EU.  
Regardless of the extent to which political considerations guide Chinese investment in 
the EU, said investment has taken a fundamentally political dimension across the bloc. EU 
leaders have come to view Chinese investment as not only an economic policy issue, but a 
political one too. As such, conversations concerning how best to address the influx of Chinese 
OFDI have become important agenda items in Brussels over the past decade.   
 
 
Chapter III – EU Institutional Pushback Against Chinese OFDI 
 
 
 
As Chinese FDI into the EU has skyrocketed it has been met with increasing skepticism 
and trepidation. In the immediate aftermath of the GFC, Chinese OFDI was welcomed with 
open arms across the bloc. This is was especially true in the debt-saddled Mediterranean 
economies which were in desperate need of capital infusion to jumpstart economic recovery. 
However, at an institutional level, the EU has toughened its stance on Chinese foreign 
investment as it relates to national security, technology transfers, state support, and 
                                                        
“The ‘16+1 Cooperation’ under the ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative,” in China’s Relations with Central and Eastern Europe: 
From “Old Comrades” to New Partners, ed. Weiqing Song (London: Taylor and Francis Group, 2017), 29-47. 
 33 
unreciprocated market access. In fact, as a direct reaction to perceived Chinese economic 
assertiveness across the continent and beliefs in an unequal playing field for EU firms vis-à-vis 
their Chinese competitors, the EU now is in the process of implementing a foreign investment 
screening mechanism and a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with Beijing.  
 
Evolving Perceptions of Chinese OFDI  
 
The EU’s openness to Chinese OFDI over the past decade is unsurprising given the bloc’s 
level of openness to investment overall. According to the OECD’s FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness 
Index (FDI RRI), many EU countries ranked among the most open in the world in 2010 and 
continue to be ranked near the top currently.77 Most EU countries are particularly lenient in 
regards to pre-establishment investment conditions, such as screening and ownership policies, 
and are ranked well above both the US and the OECD average in terms of overall 
restrictiveness. In fact, as their rankings in the FDI RRI suggest, only a handful of EU countries 
had any sort of FDI screening mechanism in place prior to 2012.78 The ideological aversion 
towards investment restrictiveness across the bloc can perhaps be best summed up by Karel De 
Gucht, who as European Commissioner for Trade in 2012 stated that “European security 
screening of new investments is neither desirable nor feasible.”79   
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 Chinese investment in the EU following the GFC did not initially challenge the bloc’s 
stance towards unfettered openness to FDI. In fact, to the contrary, the Euro crisis softened 
political resistance to Chinese investment. Long term concerns over the quantity and 
destination of Chinese OFDI were trumped by short term economic priorities, such as reeling in 
unemployment and finding buyers for privatization plans mandated by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).80 Thus, Chinese investment was courted across the EU, with countries 
such as Hungary going as far as to offer citizenship by investment.81 Even France, a country 
which has traditionally been more cautious towards inward foreign investment, was receptive 
of Dongfeng’s 2014 investment into floundering Peugeot.82 Though European leaders 
understood that Chinese FDI in Europe could present possible long term concerns, the short 
term benefits of Chinese capital for domestic economies took precedence. Once again, Karel De 
Gucht’s reminder, “let us be frank: we need the money,” seemed to the capture the collective 
feeling in a still-recovering Europe.83  
 Despite an EU-wide prioritization of economic recovery, of which an infusion of Chinese 
capital was an important piece, concerns over the size and scope of Chinese OFDI began gaining 
traction across the bloc. Though there is a dearth of extensive public opinion data regarding 
European perceptions of China, a poll commissioned by the BBC in 2011 found that negative 
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perceptions of China’s economic practices were on the rise in a number of major EU 
countries.84 In comparison with a poll from 2005, negative perceptions of China’s economic 
growth have increased by 22 points in France, 10 points in both Germany and Italy, and 7 points 
in the UK.85 While most respondents identified unfair trade practices as their primary gripe with 
China, think-tankers and EU bureaucrats were becoming increasingly concerned with Chinese 
investment practices. For example, a 2011 European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) policy 
brief entitled “The Scramble for Europe” warned against China’s “exploitive” investment 
practices in post-crisis Europe and called for a more coordinated approach to managing 
incoming Chinese FDI.86 In a letter written to EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso, 
Commissioners for Industry and Entrepreneurship, Antonio Tajani, and the Internal Market, 
Michel Barnier, voiced similar concerns over the explosion of Chinese (as well as Russian) OFDI. 
In particular, the two Commissioners implored Barroso to consider a supranational body to vet 
foreign investment into the bloc as a way to protect critical European technology.87  
 Calls for caution towards Chinese investments in the EU became more prevalent as 
Chinese firms redoubled their investment efforts and a handful of major Chinese investments 
fell through. As noted in the chapter on FDI flows, prior to the GFC, Chinese investment into the 
EU was negligible, and from 2010 to 2016 there has been only one year (2013) in which the 
quantity of Chinese OFDI into the EU has not increased markedly. The novelty of Chinese 
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investment into the EU as well as the rapidity with which it has grown, is, in and of itself, a 
source of anxiety for many Europeans.88 Numerous authors have drawn the comparison 
between contemporary European fears of Chinese investment with American fears over the 
explosion of Japanese OFDI in the US in the 1980s89 or even French concerns over the pervasion 
of American consumerism in the 1990s.90  
Yet, critical attitudes toward the influx of Chinese capital are not solely visceral and 
protectionist reactions to the novelty Chinese OFDI. A number of high-profile, unsuccessful 
Chinese investments in the EU put Chinese investment practices under the microscope, calling 
into question the motivations of Chinese firms and their level of entanglement with the Chinese 
government. For example, in 2010 Tianjin Xinmao withdrew its bid for Dutch fiber optic cable 
company, Draka, after receiving significant pushback from Dutch parliamentarians who saw the 
proposed takeover as an attempt to siphon-off key European technology.91 Competition 
concerns were raised most notably during  Chinese Overseas Engineering Company’s (COVEC) 
unfinished highway project in Poland, in which the SOE was able to win the construction 
contract with a 30-50% lower bid price than competitors, and a 2012 EU investigation into 
Huawei and ZTE for receiving unacceptable government subsidies.92 All of these cases did little 
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to paint Chinese investment in a positive light and pushed the EU to take a more critical stance 
toward Chinese investment.  
The evolution of the EU’s position towards China can be seen most clearly in their 
official strategy documents regarding China. More specifically, from 2013 to 2019, the EU’s 
rhetoric vis-à-vis China has taken on a tougher and more pragmatic tone. In 2013, the EU and 
China released the “EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation,” a sixteen page, jointly 
adopted document which identifies a variety of policy areas for future cooperation, ranging 
from peace and security to people-to-people exchanges. As would be expected in a jointly 
adopted document, the tone is quite amicable. There are a number of specific goals, especially 
in terms of economic policy, that directly address EU concerns with China, yet they are 
articulated in a hopeful and non-accusatory way. For example, rather than state that China is 
using shoddy regulatory standards as a pretense for limiting market access for EU goods, the 
agenda states that both the EU and China “confirm their commitment towards international 
standardization and notification of any standards-restricting market access.”93  
Though the EU has reaffirmed its support for the policy agenda articulated in the “EU-
China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation,” the Commission found it necessary to release a 
document entitled “Elements for a new EU strategy on China” in 2016. The tone of the strategy 
document is undoubtedly firmer than the 2013 agenda, with the EU recognizing the importance 
of putting “its own interests at the forefront in the new relationship” and of the “constructive 
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management of differences.”94 Moreover, the 2016 strategy document directly calls out many 
of China’s problematic economic practices which were alluded to in the 2013 agenda. In 
particular, “Elements for a new EU strategy on China” emphasizes China’s lack of progress in 
implementing market-based reforms that open the Chinese economy to foreign firms as well as 
the lack of “free market principles” that guide Chinese OFDI in the EU.95 However, the 2016 
strategy document falls short of being completely adversarial. The EU firmly highlights areas of 
concern with the state of the EU-China economic relationship, without presenting the points of 
contention as unreconcilable differences.  
The EU’s most recent strategy paper regarding China, released in March of 2019, is its 
most forceful and pragmatic yet. The document, entitled “EU-China – A strategic outlook,” 
proposes first and foremost a “further EU policy shift towards a more realistic, assertive, and 
multi-faceted approach.”96 It is the first policy document that explicitly labels China as an 
“economic competitor” and a “systemic rival promoting alternative modes of governance,” and 
instead of simply imploring China to reform its policies, the document considers ways in which 
the EU can respond to China’s obstinance.97 For instance, the Commission advocates the 
adoption of a newly reformed EU public procurement mechanism that “levels the playing field” 
with China.98 But most importantly, the Commission’s latest China strategy document is 
suggestive of a marked change in perception toward China. While the EU continues to harp on 
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many of the same policy concerns that have been voiced for over a decade, it seems to 
conceptualize its relationship, especially its economic relationship, with China in a more realistic 
way. The EU recognizes that if China has failed to implement a broad set of market-based 
reforms, which often benefits Chinese domestic industry at the expense of the EU, they are 
unlikely to change their ways moving forward.  
This shift in the Commission’s perception towards China’s economic policies – from 
hopeful and patient to more pessimistic and adversarial – has been amplified in the past year. 
The Federation of German Industries (BDI), in a recent study, contends that “for a long time it 
looked as if China would move towards the liberal, open-market economies of the West by 
integrating into the world economy and reshaping its economic system. This theory of 
convergence is no longer tenable.”99 The BDI’s perspective is shared by European leaders such 
as French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and Austrian 
Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, who this year decried the EU’s naïve reaction to China’s economic 
practices. Macron in particular addressed concerns over Chinese OFDI in the EU, labelling 
China’s rapid acquisition of EU infrastructure as a “strategic error” on the EU’s part.100  
While the growing discontent with China’s economic policies, as enumerated in the 
various EU strategy documents and by certain European leaders, does not center solely around 
Chinese investment practices, Chinese OFDI in the EU has brought many of the EU’s concerns to 
the forefront. At the most basic level, the EU has begun to realize that the usual benefits of 
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foreign investment for the recipient economy may not be materializing. When addressing the 
issue of Chinese FDI in the EU in 2012, De Gucht reiterated what was thought to be common 
knowledge in FDI literature: foreign investment would increase trade and economic activity 
with the country of origin and the recipient economy would gain technological, organizational, 
and managerial skills.101 But as noted in the previous chapter, China’s motivation for investing 
in more advanced economies than its own is to acquire technology and managerial knowhow 
for its own firms. The “reverse flow” phenomenon is true for high-tech sectors, many of which 
are included in the Chinese government’s “Made in China 2025” plan, as well as in less 
geostrategic areas such as soccer.102 In the past decade, China has made a huge push to 
develop its domestic soccer league and turn the country into, in the words of President Xi , a 
“soccer powerhouse.”103 To help achieve this goal, China has attracted high-profile foreign 
players to its domestic league and acquired a number of major European clubs, such as one of 
Italy’s most historic and successful clubs, Internazionale.  
 
Fears of Losing Technological Superiority 
 
Chinese FDI in the EU has elicited some of the harshest backlash because of the 
possibilities for technology transfer. The prospect of Chinese firms acquiring European 
technology leaders as a way to upgrade its industrial capabilities at Europe’s expense is one of 
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the EU’s biggest concerns. The “Made in China 2025” policy has the explicit goal of moving 
China up the value chain in ten important industry sectors, and acquiring the requisite 
technology to do so is a key part of the equation. With these motivations in mind, Chinese 
acquisitions of European tech firms have raised a number of hackles. Predictably, some of the 
biggest denunciations of Chinese technology transfers have come from Germany, which sees 
itself as a direct competitor to China in terms of the production and exportation of high-tech 
goods. For example, Kuka Robotics’ takeover by Chinese firm Midea was met with considerable 
resistance, with many German officials and business leaders seeing it as a hollowing out of 
Germany’s tech industry.104  
The fear of losing a technological edge in part due to forced technology transfers is a 
fear grounded in reality. A 2019 survey of 585 European businesses from the European 
Chamber of Commerce found that more than 20% of respondents and 30% of respondents in 
high-tech sectors “felt compelled to hand over technology to Chinese business partners.”105 
Perhaps of even greater concern is that the percentage of firms who have felt compelled to 
transfer technology to Chinese partners has doubled from 2017. In some cases, Chinese firms 
have even reverted to intellectual property (IP) theft to obtain key technologies. IP theft has 
been a long-held concern of EU member states, as well as the US. Despite Chinese assurances 
that they are working to fight against IP theft and the fact that specialized courts meant to 
handle IP theft cases have existed in China since 2014106 (and tend to rule in favor of foreign 
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firms), EU firms continue to have proprietary secrets stolen. A recent notable example is the 
theft of IP from Dutch firm ASML, which makes lithography systems that trace the circuitry of 
semiconductor chips. Documents from a 2018 court case showed that six ASML employees, all 
with Chinese names, shared secret software process information with ASML’s Chinese 
competitor, XTAL.107 Unsurprisingly, XTAL’s parent company, Dongfang Jingyuan, has close ties 
with the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology.108 
 
An Unfair Playing Field 
 
Even in cases where technology transfers are not a major concern, EU firms feel 
aggrieved that government support for Chinese firms is partially responsible for takeovers. 
While the EU has a stringent competition policy that prohibits member states from aiding or 
subsidizing private firms except for in very specific conditions, Chinese firms – both SOEs and 
private firms –  often receive state support in their business dealings. This “unfair playing field” 
has been noted by the EU in its strategy documents regarding China, and also by the BDI, who 
assert that foreign takeovers by Chinese firms are aided by “low-cost loans from state-owned 
banks and direct project-based financing through the state budget and state venture capital.”109 
The Chinese government has also helped Chinese firms acquire European firms in more dubious 
ways, such as the near-takeover of semiconductor company Aixtron by Chinese investment 
                                                        
107 Zak Doffman, “China’s Spies Accused Of Stealing EU Tech Secrets, Just As China And EU Agree Stronger Ties,” 
Forbes, April 11, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/04/11/chinese-spies-accused-of-major-
european-ip-theft-just-as-china-and-europe-agree-stronger-ties/. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Bundesverban der Deutchen, “Partner and Systemic Competitor - How Do We Deal With China’s State-
Controlled Economy?” 
 43 
fund Fujian Grand Chip. In 2015, Chinese firm Sanan Optoelectrics, which has connections with 
both Fujian and the Chinese government, cancelled a large order at the last minute, causing 
Aixtron’s stock to crash and opening the door for Fujian to submit a bid to acquire Aixtron.110 
The acquisition fell through only after the German government withdrew its approval of the 
takeover under US pressure. 
Another way in which the EU feels that the playing field is unfair for EU firms is in the 
lack of reciprocal access to Chinese markets. While the EU has given China nearly unrestricted 
access to one of the world’s largest markets, China has been slow to provide similar levels of 
market access for EU firms in China. Once again, the EU expected that increased levels of 
Chinese FDI in the EU would open the door for EU firms to invest in China,111 but a litany of 
market-access restrictions are in place for EU firms. Some restrictions are direct, such as simply 
not allowing foreign firms to penetrate certain sectors, such as fintech. In other cases, market 
access is restricted in less overt ways, such as by requiring EU firms to launch joint ventures 
with Chinese counterparts, strict localization requirements, including for data; limiting foreign 
access to government-funded programs, applying strict and sometimes inconsistent regulatory 
standards on foreign goods, and a lack of transparency in investment protection.112  
An area in which the imbalance of market access is particularly acute is the case of 
procurement policy. Chinese firms are able to bid on public projects throughout the EU (and 
often do so at a lower price than any EU firm can), yet most public projects in China are only 
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open to Chinese firms. In fact, China has not signed onto the WTO’s Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA), which would otherwise prevent them from discriminating against foreign 
bidders. As a result, bidding for all of China’s mega-projects is administered by the National 
Development and Research Committee and awarded exclusively to Chinese firms.113 
 
Security Concerns 
 
Finally, Chinese OFDI has presented EU leaders with concerns over national and 
supranational security. In recent years, the EU has begun to recognize that China has 
superpower ambitions, and many of those ambitions are antithetical to the EU’s interests. The 
EU and China are by no means enemies, but nor are they security allies. Historically, the US and 
the EU are unaccustomed to receiving significant amounts of investment from non-security 
allies; indeed, neither the US nor the EU received any investment, let alone traded with, the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War.114 The murky nature of the Chinese government’s 
involvement with Chinese firms only heightens security concerns. It is hard to for the EU to 
gauge whether investments serve purely commercial interests or if there are ulterior motives. 
As previously discussed, these concerns have been manifested in the cases of sensitive 
technology, such as semiconductors or dual-use technologies. For example, Huawei has faced 
consistent scrutiny from the EU, most recently in a bloc-wide 5G security assessment released 
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in October 2019.115 Or, in 2018, the German government blocked two potential Chinese 
investments on national security grounds. The Yantai Tahai Group was prevented from taking 
over an advanced manufacturing company, Leifeld Metal Spinning AG, and China’s State Grid 
Corporation was blocked from acquiring a 20% share in 50Hertz, a provider of high-voltage 
transmission systems.116 
The security dimension of Chinese investments also encompasses critical infrastructure. 
Though Chinese investment in European infrastructure, such as the Port of Piraeus or a large 
portion of Portugal’s power grid, was welcomed in the aftermath of the GFC, on an institutional 
level the EU has grown warier. Notably, former British Prime Minister Theresa May reviewed 
the proposed takeover of Hinkley Point nuclear power plant in 2016 by a French consortium 
and the Chinese SOE General Nuclear Power Group (CGN). Though the deal eventually went 
through, May was considering the security implications of letting China have control over UK 
power production.117 Concerns with Chinese control of critical infrastructure were only 
heightened with the arrival of China’s Belt and Road initiative in the EU. Though the amount of 
BRI investment in the EU is meager in comparison with BRI investment in Asia and Africa, it is 
still viewed by the EU as a security challenge. In 2018, the EU went as far as to release its own 
strategy document on improving Europe-Asia connectivity as a way to counter China’s BRI 
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presence throughout the EU. The EU document makes no mention of BRI, and presents itself as 
a “sustainable, comprehensive, and rules-based” alternative to the Chinese model.118 
 
Toward a Bilateral Investment Treaty 
 
The EU’s new Euro-Asia connectivity strategy is just one of the ways in which the EU is 
trying to substantively push back on Chinese FDI, and it remains to be seen what impact it will 
have on the level of BRI investment in the EU. The EU has been responding to its various 
concerns with Chinese investment in two other major ways: pursuing a BIT and implementing a 
foreign investment screening mechanism. The competence of foreign investment policy was 
transferred from the national to the supranational level by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, and over the 
past decade the EU has taken more control over the bloc’s overall investment policies. Though 
the specifics of what the term “foreign direct investment” means are not fleshed out in the 
Lisbon Treaty, the EU has taken the initiative to negotiate a Comprehensive Agreement on 
Investment (CAI) with China as well as, more recently, implement a bloc-wide framework for 
screening foreign investments. 
CAI negotiations, which aim to adopt a BIT between the EU and China have been 
ongoing since 2013. The CAI was referenced in the “EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for 
Cooperation,” and has been a key agenda matter at the annual EU-China summits. The 
overarching goal of the CAI, from an EU perspective, is to level the playing field between EU 
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firms and their Chinese counterparts by bringing Chinese policy closer in line with the tenets of 
the Western, market-based economic order. The main priorities of the CAI, which have also 
unsurprisingly been the biggest stumbling blocks in reaching an agreement, are to further open 
up the Chinese market to European FDI and to protect investments.119 As previously discussed, 
China employs a variety of levers to limit market access for foreign firms, all of which the EU is 
keen to address as part of the CAI. EU leaders have voiced their frustration with the slow 
progress of negotiations, which they hope to conclude by 2020, but see ongoing dialogue with 
China on economic issues as a way to sustain liberalization pressures. 
The even greater of benefit of conducting a single BIT negotiation between the EU and 
China is that it presents a unified voice to China. Prior to 2013, each EU member state had to 
negotiate a BIT with China individually, which placed the power squarely in China’s hands.120 
China could use its greater economic leverage to force concessions out of EU member states, 
especially some of the bloc’s smaller members. Moreover, the lack of a unified policy vis-à-vis 
inbound Chinese FDI means that China can play member states off one another, needing 
investment access to only a single member state to have access to the whole EU market.121 But 
by negotiating as an entire bloc, the EU is able to eliminate some of China’s bargaining leverage. 
This has been an EU focus for a number of years, and was bluntly stated in their 2016 China 
strategy document:  
“The EU must project a strong, clear and unified voice in its approach to China. When 
Member States conduct their bilateral relations with China… they should cooperate 
with the Commission, the EEAS and other Member States to help ensure that aspects 
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relevant to the EU are in line with EU law, rules and policies, and that the overall 
outcome is beneficial for the EU as a whole.”122 
 
 
What makes an EU-led BIT negotiation with China particularly powerful is that internal 
interests are aligned quite uniformly in regards to OFDI policy; the desire to gain greater 
market access in China and compete on a more equal playing field with Chinese firms is 
shared across the bloc. 
 
FDI Screening 
 
 If CAI negotiations represent an attempt to bolster the EU’s OFDI in the direction of 
China, the newly announced investment screening mechanism directly addresses concerns 
with the nature of inward investment from China. Calls for an EU-wide foreign investment 
screening mechanism date back to 2011, when Commissioners Tajani and Barnier brought 
the idea forward in a letter. But it was not until 2017 that the idea of a supranational 
screening mechanism gained enough political momentum for then Commission President 
Juncker to propose a framework. Juncker’s proposal gained institutional consensus 
quickly, and in April 2019, the European Parliament passed the regulation establishing the 
new FDI screening framework. While the adoption of the new framework is once again a 
positive step in presenting a unified EU voice to China, its effectiveness as a tool to protect 
against Chinese OFDI detrimental to EU interests remains to be seen. 
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  Unlike the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which is a 
committee given the powers to review and potentially block FDI in the US for national security 
reasons, the EU’s FDI screening framework has no enforcement capabilities. Rather, it is a 
framework for increased cooperation and coordination whereby EU states can share and 
request information regarding specific foreign investments that potentially impact on their 
national security and public order.123 Additionally, the new regulation allows the Commission to 
voice opinions on foreign investments124 affecting multiple EU member states or foreign 
investments that impact the EU as a whole, though these opinions are non-binding for the 
member state who is the beneficiary of the investment.125 When giving its opinion on the 
quality of the foreign investment, the Commission is to pay particular attention to deals in 
sectors such as critical infrastructure, critical technologies and dual-use items, supply of critical 
inputs, access to sensitive information, and media. Finally, when considering whether or not a 
deal is “likely to affect security or public order,” the Commission will primarily take into account 
three criteria: whether the foreign investor is directly or indirectly controlled by the 
government of a third state, whether the foreign investor has previously been involved in 
activities affecting security or public order, and whether there is a “serious risk” that the foreign 
investor engages in illegal activity.126 
 Though the regulation explicitly states a stance of non-discrimination against the 
investment’s country of origin, it is clear that many of the framework’s provisions address the 
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core characteristics of Chinese OFDI in the EU. SOEs still account for a significant share of 
Chinese OFDI in the EU, and a number of Chinese firms have already faced lawsuits over IP theft 
and other illicit business activities. In fact, analysis from the Rhodium Group found that if the 
regulation’s review criteria had been applied to China’s 2018 OFDI in the EU, approximately 
83% of investments could have fallen under Commission scrutiny.127 It is uncertainwhat opinion 
the Commission would release regarding any specific investment or if member states would 
comply with the opinion, but clearly the new framework will place Chinese OFDI more squarely 
under the microscope. 
 What is interesting to note is that prior to the new pan-EU investment screening 
framework, the EU did have the capacity to review foreign investments in specific cases. The 
European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), which was implemented in 
2006, allowed the EU to review foreign investments into critical infrastructure on national 
security grounds, and the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR), which was reformed in 2004 as part of 
EU competition law, allows the EU to block anti-competitive M&As.128 However, neither the 
EPCIP nor the EUMR were often used to block any FDI into the EU, let alone Chinese FDI. The 
EUMR has been called upon to review potential investments quite frequently, but Chinese firms 
have seldom been ruled against. In fact, in 2011, five deals involving Chinese SOEs129 looking to 
acquire major European firms were reviewed under the EUMR framework, and all five rulings 
went in the favor of the Chinese SOEs.130 
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The EPCIP has seldom been used as a framework for reviewing critical infrastructure 
investments, in part because the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has tended to rule against 
claims filed under the EPCIP, interpreting national security narrowly so as to avoid economic 
protectionism.131 The ECJ’s stance has been echoed by others, most notably Commissioner De 
Gucht, who in 2012 insisted that “we cannot accept – in Europe or elsewhere – that national 
security concerns are used as a false pretense to justify the protection of vested economic 
interests.”132 
 The new foreign investment screening framework represents a major step forward for 
the EU in regards to confronting Chinese OFDI, but it does not increase the EU’s capacity to 
block investments at an institutional level. If anything, the new framework is emblematic of the 
EU’s changing perception of Chinese OFDI. The EU began the decade encouraging Chinese OFDI 
and denouncing any form of economic protectionism, but has recognized the naivety of that 
position and recently gone as far as to implement a screening mechanism with a broad remit. 
The screening mechanism, as well as the CAI, are examples of how the increase in Chinese OFDI 
in the EU have had a centripetal effect133 on the EU; the EU has recognized that Chinese OFDI 
poses unique challenges that are best confronted at a supranational level. 
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Chapter IV – Economic Cleavages in the EU 
 
 
The explosion of Chinese OFDI into the EU has pushed the bloc to pursue a unified 
approach toward Beijing, one that leverages the power of all 27 member states to address 
concerns over Chinese investment practices. However, despite visibly toughening its stance 
toward China and successfully adopting a foreign investment screening framework, the EU is 
not completely unified in its China strategy. Chinese OFDI into the EU has actually sowed a 
number of divisions within the bloc as member states grapple with how to balance 
apprehensions over Chinese investment practices with the tangible benefits of Chinese capital. 
In fact, Chinese OFDI has exacerbated a number of pre-existing economic cleavages between 
member states while also creating new ones. These cleavages, in turn, have undermined the 
EU’s official position on a number of China-related policies, such as investment screening and 
response to BRI projects in Europe.  
 The economic divisions that Chinese OFDI has inflamed in recent years are divisions that 
have underpinned EU economic relations for many decades. In essence, these divisions boil 
down to the allocation of funding between the EU’s larger, more prosperous member states 
and the smaller, less developed member states on the bloc’s periphery. For years, EU funding 
has been the primary source of “foreign” capital for these less developed member states, but as 
China has established itself as an alternative source of capital – and one that does not attach 
the same types of political conditionalities to its funding – the economic dynamics within the 
EU are shifting. 
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The Roots of the EU’s Economic Cleavages   
 
It is important to recognize that economic divisions between EU member states have 
been points of contention well before the recent influx of Chinese capital. At its most 
fundamental level, the EU has been first and foremost an economic union134 with the goal of 
integrating the European economies. In fact, the promise of upwards economic convergence 
has often provided the impetus for many countries to pursue EU accession. But with the 
integration of national economies into a single market and monetary union have come many 
challenges, and the distribution of funding between member states has often sparked thorny 
debate. For example, the allocation of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) funding has 
dominated the agenda at many Intergovernmental Conferences and the “UK rebate” has 
remained, until recently, a source of ire across the bloc.  
Beginning with the Mediterranean expansion in the 1980s, the question of structural 
funds has been a marquee agenda item for many of the EU’s smaller and less economically 
developed member states. The EU has a number of funds meant to smooth out economic and 
social imbalances between member states and even between specific regions within member 
states, most notably the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund. 
Many aspiring member states have recognized these funds as an invaluable source of capital to 
jumpstart an underdeveloped national economy, and thus a motivation for pursuing accession. 
Indeed, Greece, Spain, and Portugal were able to successfully negotiate for the creation of a 
cohesion policy as part of their accession agreements, and structural and cohesion funding was 
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increased to nearly €235bn from 2000-2006 to support the accession of many CEE countries 
and Malta as part of the EU’s eastern expansion.135  
The EU’s structural and cohesion funds, while an important piece of fostering regional 
integration, have also created a number of points of tension between member states – tensions 
that have only sharpened as Chinese capital becomes part of the equation. On the one side, 
member states have jockeyed with one another to receive a larger share of structural funding. 
This was true during negotiations for the 2004 eastern expansion, when Greece, Spain, and 
Portugal were hesitant to support the accession of the CEE countries out of fear of seeing some 
of their own funding diverted.136 Competition over fund allocation is still prominent today too. 
As the money in the structural and cohesion funds has increased from around €64bn in the 
1988-1992 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) to over €350bn in the 2014-2020 MFF, 
regional and national lobbying offices in Brussels have proliferated.137 Furthermore, EU funding 
accounts for over 2% of the national budgets of eight EU member states – Greece, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary – meaning that even small increases 
or decreases in fund allocation can have significant impacts on domestic spending in those 
countries.138 In essence, the tug-of-war over access to EU transfer payments demonstrates how 
hungry many smaller member states are for any extra investment they can get. 
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While competition between many of the smaller and less developed EU economies has 
been noteworthy, it has in many ways been overshadowed by the divide between net 
contributors and net recipients of EU funds. As part of the 2014-2020 MFF, only ten member 
states were net contributors to the EU budget139, with Germany leading the way with a €12.8bn 
net contribution.140 Unsurprisingly, many of the countries who are consistently net contributors 
to the EU budget have pushed for reducing their contributions whereas net recipients argue 
that increased levels of spending are needed to achieve greater convergence.  
This cleavage between the larger more developed economies and the smaller less 
developed economies has been especially pronounced during recent negotiations for the 2021-
2027 MFF. To address the €13bn funding gap created by the UK’s departure from the EU, 
leaders from the so-called “frugal five” countries – the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, 
and Germany – have advocated for spending cuts to the structural and cohesion funds.141 Their 
proposal was met with harsh opposition by the 16 “friends of cohesion,” a group of the EU’s 
Southern and Eastern member states, all of whom are net recipients of EU structural and 
cohesion funds.142 While the net contributors see the cut in structural funding as a necessary 
step towards pursuing new programs and accounting for the UK’s departure, the friends of 
cohesion see the move as unacceptable.143 Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán even went 
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as far as to claim that as a result of the new proposal “the poorer will get less and the richer will 
get more,” further fanning the flames between the two blocs of member states.144 
The division between net contributors and net recipients of EU funds is not the only 
enduring economic fault line cutting through the bloc. A related cleavage, the North-South 
cleavage, continues to pose challenges to the EU’s economic unity. Perhaps these two 
cleavages should not be considered completely separate, as there is a significant amount of 
overlap between Northern, contributor member states, such as the frugal five and France, and 
Southern, recipient member states, such as Greece, Portugal, Spain, Malta, and Cyprus. 
However, the specific dynamics of the North-South cleavage have become especially 
pronounced as a result of the eurozone crisis.  
Though essentially the whole EU suffered as a result of the crisis, many of the 
Mediterranean countries were hit particularly hard. By late 2011, it became clear that Portugal 
and Greece would need bailouts and the Troika – the Commission, European Central Bank, and 
the IMF – deliberated on how best to do so. The crisis pit creditors against debtors and played 
into long-held stereotypes regarding the economic practices of the North and the South. 
Specifically, the Mediterranean countries, and Greece in particular, were blamed for being 
fiscally profligate and poorly governed by both their creditors to the north and throughout the 
media.145 On the other hand, the North, and Germany in particular, was characterized as the 
iron-fisted overlord of austerity and unnecessary conditionalities. From the Southern European 
perspective, Germany was primarily concerned with recouping its loans and was reluctant to 
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help its struggling Mediterranean neighbors.146 As is usually the case, the truth lies somewhere 
between, yet bitterness remains. 
Chinese OFDI in the EU has done little to quell any of the aforementioned economic 
tensions across the bloc. Indeed, it is becoming clear that Chinese investment is actually 
deepening cleavages between the more prosperous net contributors and those to their east 
and south. The boom of Chinese investment has come precisely when the EU’s capacity for and 
prioritization of investment in its less developed peripheral regions has reached a nadir. Despite 
the fact that the volume of Chinese OFDI in the Mediterranean and CEE is dwarfed by the 
volume of structural and cohesion funds flowing to these regions, the perception of an EU 
reluctant to help its smaller member states contrasts poorly with the sudden influx of Chinese 
capital. As a result, it appears that a number of EU member states are beginning to view 
Chinese investment as an attractive alternative, or at the very least a welcome complement, to 
transfer payments from the EU.  
With regards to CEE countries, where the opposition to reducing CAP and cohesion 
funding in the next MFF have been most emphatic, the impact of Chinese OFDI has been 
particularly notable. Greenfield investment has been steadily increasing in the region and a 
report from the Mercator Institute and the Global Public Policy Institute even goes as far to 
claim that China has targeted the region with economic cooperation agreements that “promise 
to compensate for the EU’s allegedly limited ability to support development in the region after 
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the crisis.”147 Whether undermining the EU’s competence over regional development in CEE 
countries is a Chinese policy goal or not, Chinese OFDI has generally been welcomed with open 
arms throughout the region. Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Richard Rasi, recently stated that he 
sees Chinese investment as a key driver of the country’s growth,148 and Czech President Milos 
Zeman deemed his country “an unsinkable aircraft carrier of Chinese investment expansion” in 
Europe.149 Most strikingly, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has explicitly leveraged 
Chinese investment to try to prevent the EU from decreasing structural funds sent to Hungary, 
by declaring that “Central Europe needs capital to build new roads and pipelines. If the EU is 
unable to provide enough capital, we will just collect it in China.”150 What is especially revealing 
about Orbán’s statement is that it shows a prevailing conceptualization in Hungary of the EU as 
the “other.” Despite the fact that Hungary is a constituent part of the EU, Orbán does not 
appear to view China and the EU differently as sources of capital.   
Chinese investment has not only exacerbated economic divisions between the EU’s net 
creditor member states and CEE countries, but also with many Mediterranean countries. The 
dynamics are once again similar, with China acting as a newfound source of capital for countries 
in which capital is in short supply. However, China perhaps occupies an even more delicate 
position in the countries hit hardest by the eurozone crisis. When the Troika imposed austerity 
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and mandated privatization plans in Greece and Portugal as conditions for their respective 
bailouts, it was China that bought both sovereign debt and previously public assets.151 In fact, in 
the case of Portugal, China is estimated to have bought 45% of all assets put for privatization 
under the Economic Adjustment Program.152 Recently, Germany’s outspokenly critical stance 
toward Chinese investment throughout the EU has done little to repair relations with Greece 
and Portugal, who cannot help but note the hypocrisy in the German position; by requiring 
Greece and Portugal to sell-off public assets and by refusing to increase transfer payments to 
these crisis-stricken countries, Germany pushed Greece and Portugal into Chinese arms.153 As 
the secretary-general of the Portugal-China Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Sérgio Martins 
Alves, tritely conceded, “we just sold to the guys offering the most money – and evidently they 
were always Chinese in that period.”154  
In any case, the arrival of Chinese capital en masse in the Mediterranean has aggravated 
the already rocky relation between North and South, reinforcing each region’s respective 
stereotypes of one another. The North sees the Mediterranean’s openness to Chinese 
investment as risky and shortsighted – signs of poor long-term economic planning. On the other 
hand, the arrival of Chinese capital on Mediterranean shores when little was coming from the 
North has worsened the North’s harsh, inflexible; and above all else, self-interested, image. 
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China’s Influence Over Foreign Investment Review 
 
Interestingly, Chinese OFDI has gone beyond simply reinforcing pre-existing economic 
divides across the EU and has created many of its own unique points of conflict. For instance, 
the divide between national interest and local concern is visible all across the bloc. Whereas 
national governments may be wary of investment, municipalities and even private industry who 
can stand to benefit from Chinese investment do not feel the same way.155 Though concerns 
over the level and type of Chinese OFDI in the EU are in some cases justified, the undeniable 
benefits of Chinese investment for many cities and companies makes the political calculus for 
national leaders more difficult. Similarly, the rise of Chinese OFDI in the EU has also reshaped 
some of the economic cleavages between member states. When it comes to foreign investment 
screening, a division has emerged between member states highly concerned with the security 
implications of Chinese investment and those whose thirst for foreign investment trumps 
security concerns. 
Germany and France are the member states who have voiced their qualms with Chinese 
investment practices most resoundingly and who have led the charge at the EU level for a 
firmer approach to China. In many ways, they have begun to question whether Chinese OFDI 
represents a “Faustian bargain,” fearing that the short-term benefits of increased investment 
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are outweighed by potential drawbacks down the line.156 As large, prosperous economies, 
Germany and France are not as hungry for FDI to drive growth as many other smaller EU 
member states are and can thus afford to be pickier with what foreign investments they allow 
on their soil. Plus, because Chinese firms have often acquired, or attempted to acquire, German 
and French firms in sectors deemed critical to the national interest, the perceived value of 
Chinese OFDI has not been unequivocally positive. The specific fears of having technology 
siphoned off by China, and losing their place as leaders in the production of high-quality, high-
tech goods have also been filtered through a Western geopolitical lens.157 As their increasingly 
adversarial rhetoric vis-à-vis China suggests, German and French leaders may equate the 
explosion of Chinese OFDI in the EU with the rise of China more generally.158 As G8 members 
and world leaders, Germany and France are perhaps more prone to Western anxieties of being 
eclipsed by China, and the sudden insertion of Chinese capital into the heart of Europe does 
little to alleviate these fears.  
While Germany and France have been calling for less naivety toward Chinese OFDI, 
some of their traditional economic allies have expressed diverging opinions. Countries such as 
the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, who are often referred to colloquially as the 
“ideological free traders,” have increasingly sided with Mediterranean and CEE member states 
on the issue of foreign investment screening.159 On one level it might appear logical that the 
Nordics and the Netherlands – who are some of the world’s most open countries to foreign 
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investment according to the OECD’s FDI RRI – would oppose any moves that could stem the 
flow of foreign investment into the EU.160 Yet, the specific issue of Chinese OFDI is particularly 
acute for these countries. Indeed, Finland, Sweden, and the Netherlands all rank in the EU top 
ten for amount of Chinese FDI received as a share of national GDP.161 Not only are the free 
traders ideologically wed to the idea of economic openness, but they have disproportionately 
benefitted from Chinese FDI and have an interest in seeing investment flows continue.  
Thus, it is unsurprising that the Nordics and the Netherlands have pushed back on 
Germany, France, and the Commission’s calls for a stringent foreign investment screening 
mechanism. At a plenary session of the European Parliament in January, 2019, Finnish PM Juha 
Sipila criticized rising protectionism from some of the EU’s “major players” – a not so subtle jab 
at Germany and France.162 Even more substantially, the free traders formed an ad hoc coalition 
with a number of CEE and Mediterranean member states to water down the EU’s original vision 
for a foreign investment screening mechanism.163 As previously discussed, the foreign 
investment screening mechanism was first proposed by former EU Commission President 
Juncker in 2017 and aimed to emulate CFIUS by granting the Commission the power to review 
and potentially block problematic foreign investments into the EU. Despite being backed by 
Germany and France, two countries accustomed to getting their way in Brussels when they 
agree, the coalition of smaller member states successfully lobbied for a more toothless review 
mechanism. As a result, rather than bestowing the Commission with the power to block foreign 
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investments unilaterally, the competence to vet foreign investment remains at the national 
level according to the final regulation. Though the regulation has been heralded as a success by 
the EU, the regulation falls well short of what was initially envisioned by leaving each national 
government in charge of FDI policy, even when investment is deemed risky and affects multiple 
member states. 
Though not all members of the coalition cited Chinese investment as a reason to oppose 
a supranational screening mechanism, it clearly influenced the positions of a number of 
member states. Notably, a member of the Swedish Parliament’s business and trade committee 
believed that Sweden’s opposition to Juncker’s proposal “could be linked to the fact that 
Sweden’s two big carmakers [NEVS and Volvo] are owned by Chinese investors.”164 Similarly, 
during Council discussions of the proposal, Greek officials explicitly referenced Chinese 
investment as a reason for favoring a more lenient mechanism. The Greeks even went as far as 
to ask for compensation for the loss of investment from China that they would incur should a 
“protectionist” screening mechanism be adopted by the bloc.165  
China’s influence on the foreign investment screening discussions has been undeniable. 
A number of member states who have benefited from the influx of Chinese investment 
opposed a foreign investment screening mechanism that had the potential to stem the flow of 
Chinese investment into their countries. From the perspective of the member states who have 
welcomed Chinese OFDI, the regulation that was adopted in early 2019 represents a major 
victory. However, from the perspective of the EU as a single political and economic actor, the 
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current foreign investment review mechanism is not ideal. By leaving the competence to 
ultimately accept or block foreign investments to national authorities, the EU will continue to 
struggle to present a firm and unified position on FDI screening to China.  
On a pragmatic level, the current FDI review mechanism may do little to stop 
investment deemed problematic, whether of Chinese provenance or not, from entering the EU. 
Though the new mechanism exhorts all member states to begin converging their national FDI 
screening regimes, it seems unlikely that all member states will adopt rigorous standards of 
review, let alone apply them strictly. Prior to 2017, only a handful of EU member states had any 
FDI review process in place, and they were seldom used to block inward investment.166 In fact, 
by 2014, not a single Chinese investment into the EU had been blocked on the grounds of 
national security.167 Since 2017, a number of member states have begun discussing the 
adoption of a dedicated FDI screening mechanism where one previously did not exist, but 11 
member states – including Greece, Cyprus, and Malta – have made no movements to 
implement foreign investment screening mechanisms at all.168 
 Even in member states where foreign investments are screened, very few have blocked 
or threatened to block investments from China. As previously discussed, Germany has led the 
way in vigorously screening Chinese investment, blocking Chinese acquisitions of Aixtron in 
2015 and of Leifeld Metal Spinning AG and 50Hertz in 2018. Though the French are yet to block 
any Chinese investments, in January, 2020, President Macron threatened to stop Jingye’s 
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proposed takeover of British Steel and investment in their Scunthorpe steelworks factory.169 As 
was the case in Germany, the proposed blockage would come on the grounds of national 
security because British Steel’s French operation supplies a large portion of track for the 
country’s railway network. But to date, Germany and France’s aggressive approach to screening 
FDI from China has been the exception, not the rule in the EU.  
With the new FDI screening mechanism taking full effect in October 2020, there is still 
time for member states to alter their approach to screening foreign investment, especially 
foreign investment from China. But if the watering-down of the originally proposed screening 
mechanism and the subsequent lack of enthusiasm for implementing national screening 
mechanisms in many member states are anything to go by, it seems unlikely that FDI review 
standards will be harmonized and uniformly applied throughout the EU in the near future. As a 
consequence, the EU will not only be unable to prevent certain member states from accepting 
Chinese investment in strategic sectors, but they will be unable to fully leverage their power as 
a 27-country bloc to address the various challenges posed by Chinese OFDI.  
 
Fractured EU Response to BRI 
 
Chinese OFDI has created fissures in the EU in regards to BRI policy as well. While 
Brussels has generally been wary of BRI’s arrival in Europe and in EU member states, not all 
member states have shared in Brussels’ skepticism. The EU’s concerns with BRI are 
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multifaceted, and many stem from the fact that seven years after being launched, BRI still lacks 
clarity in regards to its geographical scope and its classification for projects to be included in the 
initiative.170 The EU has attempted to better understand BRI and its possible merits and 
drawbacks by commissioning a number of studies. One such study, conducted for the European 
Parliament’s Tourism and Transport Committee, highlighted a number of areas of 
apprehension, including the sustainability of Chinese lending in certain countries, regulatory 
differences between the EU and China, and Chinese control of critical infrastructure.  
One of the most commonly advanced concerns with BRI is the concept of “debt-trap 
diplomacy.” Some western leaders, scholars, and commentators fear that Chinese lending 
practices may lead to debt distress in borrower countries, which China could then leverage for 
its own geopolitical gain. These fears are often buoyed by highly scrutinized BRI initiatives in 
Southeast Asia, such as China’s takeover of the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka after the Sri 
Lankan government was unable to repay its debts to the China Harbor Engineering Company.171 
A recent study from the Center for Global Development found that in most cases, BRI lending 
from Chinese financial institutions is unlikely to create systemic debt problems.172 However, the 
same report identified Montenegro – a country currently in the EU accession process – as being 
at risk of defaulting on debt incurred as part of a BRI project linking the port city of Bar with 
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Serbia.173 Given the EU’s strict rules prohibiting sovereign debt from exceeding 60% of GDP and 
the memories of excessive borrowing feeding into the sovereign debt crisis, Chinese lending to 
Montenegro and to other EU member states is being watched carefully.174 
Possibly of even greater concern to the EU are the differences between EU regulatory 
standards and Chinese regulatory standards. The EU prides itself on upholding rigorous 
environmental and labor standards when it comes to large construction projects. Thus, it is 
unsurprising that the EU fears these standards may be undermined by the different, and often 
lower, Chinese standards in large infrastructure projects, especially those taking place in third 
countries along the EU’s periphery. To address these concerns, the study conducted for the 
Tourism and Transport Committee stresses that any cooperation between the EU’s Trans-
European Transport Network (TEN-T) and BRI must take place within a framework of “fair and 
undistorted competition based on regulatory convergence.”175 As noted in the previous 
chapter, the EU has also tried to address the dissonance in regulatory standards by promoting 
its own EU-Asia connectivity plan176 as an “alternative” to BRI, as well as by introducing a 
handful of new initiatives that specifically aim to promote economic development in the 
Balkans.177  
Finally, as has been noted previously, BRI investment has been heavily scrutinized due 
to its potential security implications. Chinese investment in critical infrastructure has been 
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particularly prevalent in the Mediterranean, as China looks to make a number of European 
ports the western terminus of the Maritime Silk Road. COSCO’s purchase of the Port of Piraeus, 
as well as their recent purchase of a 40% stake in Italy’s Vado Port and agreement with the Port 
of Trieste have raised eyebrows in Brussels.178 Investments in energy, from coal plants in 
Romania, to nuclear energy plants in the UK, and state grids in Portugal and Malta are equally 
as concerning to EU officials.179  
Despite Brussels’ persistent doubts surrounding BRI, response to BRI has lacked 
coherence throughout the EU. Institutionally, the EU has grappled with what the best level of 
participation with BRI is. EU leaders have attended diplomatic BRI summits and EU investment 
institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and 
European Investment Bank (EIB) have already partnered with China on a number of BRI 
projects.180 Yet, the EU has also promoted its own transport network policy, TEN-T, and 
proposed alternatives to Chinese funding that align more closely with its own institutional 
values. The EU’s difficulty in committing to a unified BRI policy is in part due to the ongoing 
difficulties in deciphering what exactly BRI is; it is challenging to address an initiative that is so 
sweeping yet remains poorly defined in practice. However, it has also been difficult for EU 
institutions to formulate a consistent BRI policy response because of divergent national views 
regarding BRI investment. Once again, there is a clear split between many of the EU’s Northern 
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and Western member states who tend to endorse the Commission’s skeptical stance and many 
Mediterranean and CEE countries who embrace BRI wholeheartedly.  
At an official level, the EU has decided against signing a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) with China regarding BRI, which would effectively institutionalize EU-China cooperation 
on BRI investments across the bloc. This has not stopped 18 of the EU’s 27 member states from 
signing their own bilateral MoUs and actively courting infrastructure investment from Beijing. 
Predictably, BRI’s incursion into Europe began on its eastern frontier. Poland was the first EU 
member state to sign a MoU in 2015, with many other CEE countries and non-EU member 
states such as Belarus, Ukraine, Serbia, Albania, and North Macedonia following suit.181 As BRI 
has gained more momentum, its presence has been felt in Western Europe too. Indeed, the 
most recent spate of EU members signing on to BRI have included Portugal in late 2018, and 
Italy and Austria in early 2019. While the specific projects included in the framework of BRI 
cooperation vary slightly from country to country, the underlying motivations are the same: to 
encourage greater levels of Chinese investment and increase the volume of bilateral trade.182 
Generally speaking, the countries that have been receptive to BRI are those who are most 
desperate for investment, especially infrastructure investment, and those countries who have 
not enjoyed the same level of diplomatic engagement with China that the EU’s larger member 
states have.   
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On the other hand, nine member states have held out against pressure from Beijing to 
sign MoUs. This is not to say that all nine member states have scorned the opportunity to 
increase cooperation with China on infrastructure and trade-related issues. For instance, 
despite not formalizing their involvement with BRI via a MoU, Belgium has opened up new 
freight train lines with China, began collaboration with COSCO at the ports of Antwerp and 
Zeebrugge, and even agreed a deal with Alibaba to make Liege the conglomerate’s first 
European logistics hub.183 Other member states, such as Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Spain, 
Ireland and the Netherlands have maintained a “wait-and-see” policy, neither rejecting the 
premise of BRI outright nor actively looking to participate in an official capacity.184 Finally, there 
are Germany and France, who once again have been the most outspoken opponents of BRI.  
Germany and France’s tougher stance on BRI mirrors their tougher stance on screening 
Chinese OFDI. These countries are not as hungry for Chinese investment and continue to 
highlight BRI’s imperfections – a project procurement policy that continues to favor Chinese 
firms, fears over debt sustainability, and a general lack of transparency. As such, President 
Macron has vowed to approach BRI one investment at a time, and has pushed China to make 
sure all BRI investment in the EU is win-win.185 German rhetoric toward BRI has been at times 
even less diplomatic, especially in the wake of Italy’s embrace of the project. In response to the 
first G8 country joining BRI, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas asserted that, “countries that 
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believe they can do clever business with the Chinese will wonder when they suddenly wake up 
in dependency.”186 Maas’ comments may be extreme, however they reflect larger geopolitical 
concerns that BRI investment is not solely investment, but also a vehicle for China to increase 
its influence across the world and impose its own value system.187  
Economic cleavages have always existed in the EU, whether it be between big and small 
member states, net contributors and net recipients, or debtors and creditors during the 
Eurozone crisis. In recent years, these cleavages have taken on a new dimension as Chinese 
OFDI has soared into the EU. Chinese investment has been seen by many member states – 
especially those who are less economically developed – as an important new source of capital. 
Yet member states do not evaluate the potential risks of Chinese OFDI identically. Germany and 
France have been leery of what the long-term drawbacks of Chinese investment may be for 
their respective countries and for the EU as a bloc, and thus have called for more caution vis-à-
vis Chinese OFDI. However, other member states do not find these potential risks as credible, or 
if they do, have prioritized short-term needs for an investment boost over these concerns. This 
fault line, consequentially, has challenged the EU’s internal cohesion and undermined the bloc’s 
ability to approach key China policy issues with a unified voice.   
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Chapter V – From Economic to Political Influence 
 
 
 
Chinese OFDI has clearly deepened economic cleavages in the EU, making it difficult for 
the bloc to formulate a cohesive set of policies addressing the challenges posed by inward 
Chinese investment. But Beijing has also leveraged economic influence into increased political 
influence in the EU as well. The political implications of Chinese OFDI go beyond the issues 
directly pertinent to EU-China economic relations, such as the previously discussed investment 
screening mechanism and policy toward BRI. Indeed, Beijing has translated its economic 
relationship into political alliances with many of the EU’s more illiberal, Eurosceptic leaders, 
who now find they have an ally outside of Brussels. Even more striking, China has used its 
economic power to gain important political concessions on issues such as receiving the Dalai 
Lama, the South China Sea conflict, the Hong Kong protests, and various human rights concerns.  
 
An Ally to Eurosceptical and Illiberal Leaders 
 
In the EU, some of China’s most amicable bilateral relations are with member states that 
are increasingly illiberal, Eurosceptical or some combination thereof. This is not to say that 
China is intentionally trying to promote illiberalism and Euroscepticism across the bloc as a way 
to undermine the EU. In fact, what seems more likely is that member states that feel 
increasingly ostracized or neglected by Brussels – which are often the same member states 
hungry for foreign investment – have been drawn to China. But in either case, it is clear that 
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China has been more than happy to embrace its role as an alternative to the liberal, 
cooperative, Brussels-based order.188  
China as a political and economic alternative to the EU has been especially attractive for 
some of the EU’s increasingly illiberal member states. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán 
and Poland’s Law and Justice party have come under fire for subverting the rule of law and a 
litany of other “breaches” of core EU values.189 As a result, the EU has repeatedly threatened to 
impose economic sanctions on both countries if they fail to address democratic backsliding. It is 
unsurprising then, that both countries have worked hard in recent years to nurture their 
economic and political relationships with Beijing; China’s political and economic cooperation, in 
contrast to the EU’s, does not contain the political conditionalities of good governance and 
liberal economic reform.190 In both Hungary and Poland, leaders have cozied up to China by  
hosting a number of high-level Chinese officials and signing increasingly involved cooperation 
agreements.191 Prime Minister Orbán has gone even further, most notably at a 2016 China-CEE 
Political Parties Dialogue when he delivered a speech criticizing EU integration and endorsing 
China’s rejection of universal values and norms.192  
A number of other EU leaders skeptical of the European project have bolstered their 
relationships with China in recent years too. A glaring example is Czech President Milos Zeman, 
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who since coming to power in 2014 has aggressively pursued improved relations with China. He 
has gone beyond the reverent rhetoric and historic bilateral summits with China typical of many 
EU leaders. Indeed, he was the only Western leader to attend a 2016 military parade in Beijing 
celebrating the anniversary of the end of World War II.193 Furthermore, he appeared on 
Chinese television, stating that Czech submissiveness to the EU had been preventing a Czech-
Chinese rapprochement.194  
As Zeman’s comment would suggest, his kowtowing to Beijing has been accompanied by 
a domestic platform of Euroscepticism. He has consistently denigrated the EU’s treatment of 
the Czech Republic and in 2016 even proposed a referendum to exit the EU. The likes of Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic might represent the most extreme cases of member states 
disparaging the EU while simultaneously nurturing their relationship with Beijing, but subtler 
examples of this trend are visible in other member states as well. Eurosceptic leaders such as 
Italian Prime Minister Matteo Salvini and former Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras have 
prioritized their relationship with China, and leaders of German right-wing parties such as 
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and Bürgerrechtsbewegung Solidarität (BüSo) have adopted 
official Chinese political language as part of their campaigns to criticize Chancellor Merkel.195  
China’s improved relationships with a number of vexing EU leaders is concerning for the 
EU for a few reasons. On a pragmatic level, the EU could lose some of its economic leverage 
over countries under censure because they have a newfound, wealthy ally whose capital does 
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not have good-governance strings attached. Just as Viktor Orbán has explicitly stated, EU 
member states may now be able to turn to China as an alternative for funding if they feel 
Brussels is being unaccommodating. But perhaps even more importantly, China’s close 
economic and political partnership with leaders skeptical of the European project is harmful to 
EU political unity. On a symbolic level, China’s approval of illiberal and Eurosceptic leaders, 
whether overt or tacit, legitimizes their views and empowers them to hold firm against 
Brussels. These Eurosceptic leaders may no longer feel alienated and powerless against Brussels 
knowing they have the support of China. In essence, not only does the Chinese economic and 
political model provide ideological fodder for leaders questioning the validity of the EU’s 
normative prescriptions, but it represents a convenient piece of leverage during negotiations 
with Brussels and other EU-friendly governments.196 Once again, it should be remembered that 
the basis for China’s improved relations with many EU governments has been the promises of 
increased investment levels. It is from these original economic arrangements that deeper 
diplomatic and political ties emerge. 
Chinese political influence manifests itself not only in the emboldening of Eurosceptic 
and illiberal governments, but also in more visible and substantive ways. Indeed, China has 
parlayed its economic presence throughout the bloc into support from many EU member states 
on political issues important to China. This support goes beyond economic issues directly 
addressing China, such as the FDI screening mechanism that was watered down by a coalition 
of member states, to include key geopolitical and human rights concerns. This pattern of 
economic might influencing political decision-making has been well-documented outside of 
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Europe – most notably in Latin America and Africa197 – but it now appears that China has 
effectively been able to wield OFDI as a carrot and a stick within the EU as well.  
 
The Dalai Lama Question 
 
Perhaps the most prominent example of China shaping EU member state policy on a 
salient political issue is in regards to the Dalai Lama. A 2013 paper by Fuchs and Klann found 
that countries whose leadership received the Dalai Lama saw exports to China subsequently dip 
as a punishment.198 European countries have been no exception to this economic punishment 
from China. In fact, as countries have come to value courting Chinese OFDI, in addition to 
boosting bilateral trade, deference to China on the Dalai Lama issue has been all the more 
visible. In 2012, China cancelled a number of ministerial meetings with the UK, including with 
the UK Trade and Investment Minister, due to David Cameron’s meeting with the Dalai Lama 
just a month prior.199 More recently, Slovakia’s ambassador to Beijing sent a letter to Chinese 
Foreign Minister Wang Yi, apologizing for their country’s reception of the Dalai Lama in 2016 
and reaffirming their respect for China’s territorial integrity.200 The letter was only sent after 
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang cancelled a bilateral meeting with Slovakian Prime Minister Robert 
Fico and the economic and diplomatic price of the Dalai Lama’s visit became clear.  
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The most striking example of an EU government changing policy on the Dalai Lama to 
accommodate China’s foreign policy wishes is the Czech Republic. Thanks in part to Vaclav 
Havel’s legacy, the Czech Republic has for a long time been one of the EU’s most outspoken 
defenders of human rights and has historically welcomed the Dalai Lama to Prague with open 
arms.201 But in 2016, President Zeman, along with Prime Minister Sobotka and the heads of the 
Czech parliament’s upper and lower chambers issued a public statement reprimanding three 
high-level minsters who had met with the Dalai Lama. The uncle of one of the censured 
ministers, a Holocaust survivor, was even withheld a government medal by President Zeman 
because of his nephew’s actions.202 Curiously, the joint statement rebuking the three ministers 
was preceded by a confidential visit to Prague Castle – the seat of the Czech President – by 
Chinese Ambassador Ma Keqing.”203 Though the Czech government did not officially 
acknowledge the reason for abruptly changing policy on receiving the Dalai Lama, it is clear that 
a combination of Chinese pressure and proactive efforts to endear themselves to Beijing were 
central considerations.  
 
A Lack of Consensus 
 
China’s economic sway over the bloc could also be seen in a 2016 ruling regarding 
territorial disputes in the South China Sea. After an international panel in The Hague ruled in 
favor of the Philippines and against China, EU members quibbled for 72 hours over the contents 
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of a joint statement addressing the ruling.204 EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini’s final 
statement was a lowest common denominator statement, one that did not explicitly mention 
China, let alone take a critical stance toward them. Instead, Mogherini’s statement read: “While 
not taking a position on claims to land territory and maritime space in the South China Sea, the 
EU urges all claimants to resolve disputes through peaceful means, to clarify the basis of their 
claims, and to pursue them in accordance with international law including UNCLOS and its 
arbitration procedures.”205 Mogherini’s statement marked a significant departure from the EU 
norm of supporting international law and the United Nations in the majority of its foreign policy 
stances. One EU diplomat even called the statement “shameful” due to its lack of criticism of 
China.206  
But Mogherini’s toothless statement on behalf of the EU was more a reflection of the 
stance of a few EU member states rather than the whole bloc. Releasing a foreign policy 
statement requires consensus among EU members, and three members – Hungary, Greece, and 
Croatia – required the EU to revise down its original statement.207 Croatia favored a watered-
down statement due to its own ongoing territorial disputes with Slovenia over the Gulf of 
Piran,208 but Hungary and Greece’s refusal to support a statement critical of China evince 
Beijing’s influence over the two member states. Indeed, diplomats involved in the discussion 
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regarding the joint statement noted that concerns about harming economic ties with China 
factored into the debate.209 Additionally, before The Hague’s decision, former Greek Prime 
Minister Alexis Tsipras was invited to Beijing for five days to discuss, among a variety of topics, 
the upcoming ruling.210 One day after Mogherini’s statement, Hungary broke ranks again by 
issuing its own individual statement on the ruling that clearly sided with China. The statement 
asserted that “countries should settle disputes ‘through direct negotiations’ and that ‘external 
pressure and interference may have an adverse effect on the current situation.’”211 Clearly it is 
no coincidence that two of the member states most fearful of upsetting China and possibly 
losing investment were those that defected from the common EU position.  
Lack of EU consensus on China-related issues is not an isolated event. Rather, the EU has 
been unable to release statements regarding various Chinese human rights abuses in recent 
years due to individual member states dissenting. And once again, the main culprits have been 
Greece and Hungary. In 2017, Greece was the only EU member state to veto a statement 
condemning China’s human right’s record at the UN Human Rights Council (UNHCR). Greek 
officials claimed the statement was an “unconstructive criticism of China,”212 and that EU-China 
dialogues on human rights would be a “more efficient and constructive way of delivering better 
results.”213 In a similar situation, Hungary prevented the EU from releasing a joint letter in 2017 
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condemning China’s practice of detaining and torturing human rights lawyers.214 According to 
EU diplomats, Hungarian officials even threatened to block all future joint declarations 
criticizing Beijing’s human rights record.215 The EU’s inability to release joint statements 
challenging China’s human rights abuses is particularly worrying given the implications for the 
bloc’s reputation. The EU has for many years prided itself on being a staunch defender of liberal 
values such as peace, inclusivity, and human rights. The EU was even awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 2012 for its six-decade commitment to the “advancement of peace and reconciliation, 
democracy, and human rights in Europe.”216 As is such, Greece and Hungary’s blockage of joint 
declarations has been deeply frustrating to many EU officials.  
Despite the outcry over Greece and Hungary’s defection from the EU’s critical position 
toward China on a number of issues, recent developments in Hong Kong and Xinjiang indicate 
that the bloc is no closer to presenting a unified voice on human rights issues than in previous 
years. As protests in Hong Kong over political independence from Beijing have boiled over, pro-
China riot police have been accused of a number of human rights abuses, including firing upon 
and killing protestors. In response, whereas the US Congress passed a 2019 bill imposing 
sanctions on those responsible for human rights violations in Hong Kong, the EU’s response has 
been relatively muffled. In July 2019, the European Parliament passed a non-binding resolution 
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that called for an investigation into police violence in Hong Kong, and in November 2019 the 
Commission called for de-escalation following the siege of Hong Kong Polytechnic University.217  
The EU’s mild response to the events unfolding in Hong Kong has once again been 
influenced by economic relations with China. In this case, there has not been one distinct group 
of countries vocally opposed to a tougher line on China. Instead, Brussels has seemed reluctant 
to do anything more than issue statements that implore China to de-escalate and that reaffirm 
political support for Hong Kong. A number of anonymously quoted EU diplomats confirmed that 
recalcitrance across the bloc stemmed from fear of retaliation from China – which they 
witnessed in response to the US Congress’s “Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act.”218 
One diplomat was even quoted as saying “there is little more that can be done. At the end of 
the day, I fear that the economic relationship with China is just too important.”219 The fact that 
this sentiment appears to be widespread in the case of the Hong Kong protests, rather than 
confined to a few EU member states, is worrying for the bloc. Even France, who are one of the 
most outspoken voices on China, attempted to tamp down on official criticism of the Hong 
Kong police before President Macron’s four-day visit to China.220 In essence, China’s economic 
leverage has successfully prevented one of the world’s foremost human rights advocates from 
taking significant action in response to clear human rights violations. 
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The story has been similar regarding the EU’s response to the detention of Uighurs and 
other ethnic minorities in China’s Xinjiang province. A number of UN reports have denounced 
the “re-education camps” that have proliferated in Xinjiang and called upon China to allow 
independent monitors to access the province.221 Up until December 2019, the EU’s response 
toward the treatment of the Uighur people has been restrained. Foreign policy chief Federica 
Mogherini reiterated the UN’s call for both independent monitors and an investigation while 
urging member states to open their borders to Uighur asylum-seekers. So far, only Sweden has 
heeded her calls by granting all Uighur asylum-seekers refugee status, and individual member 
states have either voiced muted concerns regarding the situation in Xinjiang or said nothing at 
all.222  
In July 2019, 15 of the EU’s 27 member states signed a letter to the UN High 
Commissioner for human rights condemning China’s actions in Xinjiang, but a lack of bloc-wide 
solidarity on the issue prevented a joint letter from the whole EU being released.223 In fact, the 
12 countries that did not sign the letter – Italy, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Greece, Hungary, and the Czech Republic – are all Southern or CEE 
member states that have thirsted for Chinese investment and often split with Brussels on key 
China-related issues. A European Parliament resolution passed in December 2019 was the most 
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unequivocal rebuke of Beijing’s treatment of the Uighur and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang. 
However, the resolution once again falls short of taking any concrete action.224 
Interestingly, on the issue of Taiwan, EU member states do not seem to be particularly 
swayed by Chinese influence. The EU adheres to a long-standing “One China” policy, which 
means that the bloc has no diplomatic or formal political relations with Taiwan. The EU does 
however have structured dialogue with Taipei, supports their participation in international fora, 
and maintains a strong economic relationship with the island.225 Plus, in recent years, a number 
of member states have looked to work within the One China framework to deepen their 
relations with Taiwan. Taiwanese officials have been hosted in a number of European capitals, 
and numerous governments have voiced a desire to include Taiwan in more international 
organizations. For example, in October 2019, the Dutch Parliament passed a motion supporting 
Taiwanese participation in international fora.226 Sweden, who were urged not to air a 
documentary about democracy in Taiwan on Swedish television by the Chinese embassy, did 
not bow to the pressure and continue to call for greater Taiwanese participation in a number of 
international organizations.227  
Even the Czech Republic, which has in many cases prioritized investment from China 
over other human rights and geopolitical considerations, have stood strong on the Taiwan 
question. In response to the city of Prague signing a cooperation agreement with Taiwan and 
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the Czech Senate Speaker, Jaroslav Kubera, planning to visit Taiwan, Beijing responded with a 
salvo of economic threats. These included cancelling the Prague Philharmonic Orchestra’s tour 
of China, revoking a promise to the Prague city zoo to host a panda, and directly threatening 
Czech companies operating in China.228 In fact, a letter sent by China’s embassy in Prague to the 
Czech president’s office stated that “Czech companies who have economic interests in China 
will have to pay for the visit to Taiwan by Chairman Kubera.”229 Interestingly, President Zeman 
has shown reluctance to get involved in the Prague-China spat and so far has not publicly called 
upon Chairman Kubera to cancel his trip.  
Given the complexity of China’s economic statecraft, it is difficult to definitively say that 
access to Chinese investment has been the motivating force for defection on key consensus 
issues in the EU. Indeed, China seems to leverage its whole economic package – volume of 
bilateral trade, OFDI, access to the Chinese market, and more generally good economic and 
diplomatic relations – as a way to force compliance from other countries. But in the case of EU 
countries such as Hungary, Portugal, Greece, and the Czech Republic, Chinese investment 
seems to be the biggest carrot. Not only have these member states specifically voiced a need 
for foreign investment, but they have received a disproportionately large share of Chinese OFDI 
in the EU given the size of their respective economies. Moreover, whereas Chinese OFDI in 
these countries has taken off in the past decade, increases in bilateral trade, in most cases, 
have been more modest. According to the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics, in both Hungary 
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and Greece, the volume of bilateral trade has remained almost identical since 2008, and the 
volume of bilateral trade between Portugal and China has increased by roughly $1 billion over 
the past decade. The Czech Republic is the exception, seeing both the volume of imports from 
China and exports to China more than double over the past decade. Once again, it is difficult to 
disentangle the OFDI effects and trade effects on the shift in political stance of certain EU 
leaders, however, the timing of these political defections coincides with a period in which 
Chinese investment in these member states has skyrocketed.  
Brussels’ reluctance to take meaningful measures against Beijing out of fear of 
damaging economic relations, as well as the defection of a few particularly China-friendly 
member states on consensus issues, is indicative of how China has turned economic relations 
into political leverage. This leverage has been particularly acute in some of the EU’s smaller 
member states and those that may feel maligned by Brussels. The pattern of using economic 
power, and in particular promises of investment and increased trade, to gain concessions on 
human rights and geopolitical issues is not without precedent. A 2017 Human Rights Watch 
report detailed how China “seeks to exert economic and political pressure on countries to 
obtain its goals,” with smaller and poorer countries as the main target.230 Their efforts have 
often been effective, as aid-dependent African nations have refused to criticize Beijing’s human 
rights record and countries such as Panama and Sao Tome and Principe announced in 2016 that 
they would sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan.231 Even in the US, China has used its economic 
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power for political ends. Hollywood studios, major companies, and most recently, the National 
Basketball Association (NBA) have kowtowed to Beijing on politically salient issues in order to 
retain lucrative market access. 
China has demonstrated its ability to parlay economic relations into political support 
across the world, but the trend is particularly worrying in the EU. In one respect, it is worrying 
because Beijing has positioned itself as an ally of EU member states that are either subverting 
EU values or questioning the continued validity of the European project. China does not invest 
nearly as much in frustrated EU countries as these countries receive in transfer payments from 
Brussels, but what China lacks in investment quantity they make up for in political nous; China 
does not attach any conditionalities of good governance to their OFDI which many illiberal and 
Eurosceptic leaders find chafing, and the bilateral nature of their relationships confers a sense 
of importance on smaller member states that they do not usually experience at the EU level. 
China’s increasing political influence in the EU is also concerning because it threatens the EU’s 
prospects for cohesion on key foreign policy issues. The allure of Chinese OFDI has stifled 
attempts to implement supranational FDI screening, a unified policy toward BRI, and even 
action on human rights violations, of which the EU has been a longstanding champion.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
The inrush of Chinese OFDI into the EU has been nothing short of remarkable. In the 
past decade, Chinese investment in EU member states has increased from $1 billion per annum 
to over 40 times that. Investment has been concentrated in the EU’s most robust economies 
although some of the bloc’s smaller member states have been the biggest beneficiaries of 
Chinese OFDI when measured as a share of host country GDP. Chinese OFDI in the EU has also 
been quite idiosyncratic, with total investment volume, SOE share of investment, and regional 
destination of investment within the EU varying noticeably year to year. Some of the 
idiosyncrasy in Chinese OFDI trends can be chalked up to what mega-deals were agreed upon in 
any given year; roughly 95% of Chinese OFDI in the EU has taken the form of M&As and a 
couple of large deals can dramatically reshape the yearly OFDI landscape in the EU. But the 
idiosyncrasy of Chinese investment in the EU is also a reflection of the unique nature of Chinese 
OFDI. 
 Chinese investment into the EU stands out for a variety of reasons. For one, Chinese 
OFDI into the EU is a rare case of a less-developed economy investing in a more-developed 
economy. As such, the dynamics of China’s investment in the EU break from the paradigm of 
FDI decision-making. Though there is still disagreement in the literature, it appears that 
Beijing’s strategy of supporting Chinese firms to acquire high-tech EU firms is predominately an 
asset-seeking strategy rather than a market-seeking one. Indeed, the pattern of large Chinese 
firms buying up European firms in critical industries is a way to gain both managerial and 
technological knowhow. Beijing has made a concerted effort, as evidenced by their succession 
 88 
of five-year plans, to make domestic firms more competitive in international markets and move 
production up the value chain. The EU is an ideal location for Beijing to focus its OFDI precisely 
because it possesses the assets required to upgrade Chinese industry – a raft of high-tech 
manufacturing firms, managerial prowess, and globally recognized brands. 
 As the EU faced economic stagnation in the wake of the GFC, Chinese OFDI was 
welcomed and even courted aggressively in certain member states. But as the short term need 
for a capital influx dwindled and the EU began to appreciate some of China’s underlying 
motivations for investing in the bloc, Brussels reformulated its stance on Chinese investment 
practices. In particular, the rapid rise of Chinese OFDI across the EU highlighted the lack of 
reciprocal market access that EU firms have in China and exposed fears over the security 
implications of Chinese penetration in strategic EU sectors, such as high-tech manufacturing, 
dual use technologies, and critical infrastructure. To a certain extent, as Sophie Meunier states 
it, Chinese OFDI had a centripetal effect on the EU.232  In response to Beijing’s investment 
practices – which Brussels recognized may be benefitting Chinese firms at the EU’s expense – 
the bloc is continuing to push China to sign a bilateral investment treaty and implemented an 
FDI screening mechanism.  
 Though Brussels has recognized the challenges of Chinese OFDI for the bloc and 
member states have come together to begin addressing them, Chinese investment has had 
significant centrifugal effects as well. Chinese OFDI has deepened pre-existing economic 
cleavages between member states and sowed new divisions across the bloc. It has become 
increasingly clear that not all member states analyze the costs and benefits of Chinese OFDI 
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uniformly. Some of the bloc’s larger and wealthier member states – Germany and France in 
particular – have been the most outspoken skeptics of Chinese OFDI whereas many of the 
smaller EU economies on the bloc’s fringes have continued to woo Chinese capital.  
 Differences in member state opinion vis-à-vis Chinese OFDI has made collective action 
difficult. Though the EU did adopt an FDI screening mechanism, it was watered-down by a 
number of investment-hungry member states so as to essentially keep the competence over 
FDI screening at the national level. Similarly, disagreement over the potential value of BRI for 
the EU has inhibited the creation of a coherent EU policy toward the initiative. Chinese OFDI 
has also hampered the EU’s ability to address foreign policy issues that go beyond China’s 
investment practices. In fact, Beijing has leveraged its economic relationship with a number of 
the EU’s smaller member states – many of whom have Eurosceptic leaders at the helm – to gain 
concessions on foreign policy concerns important to China.  
 Given China’s ability to parlay OFDI into influence in both the EU and other regions of 
the world, commentators continue to grapple with the underlying motivations for Beijing’s 
economic statecraft. The phrases “divide and conquer” and “divide and rule” have become 
nearly ubiquitous with China’s strategy for dealing with the EU, especially among European 
thing-tankers such as Le Corre, Parello-Plesner, Godement, and Benner. While it is clear that 
Chinese OFDI has at times divided the bloc by exacerbating fault lines between member states 
– most notably between the wealthier member states less hungry for investment and more 
concerned with security and the poorer member states in which a desire for FDI trumps other 
considerations – it is not clear that Beijing intends to conquer or rule the EU. Even more 
importantly, it is not clear what exactly most commentators even mean by the terms “conquer” 
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or “rule.” It seems unlikely that China’s overarching ambition is to dominate the EU in a grand 
strategy sense of the word or to throw the future of the European project into jeopardy. 
Rather, this author is of the opinion that China’s strategy for dealing with the EU boils down to 
self-interest and pragmatism; Beijing engages with EU member states in a way that helps it best 
achieve its own domestic and foreign policy goals. 
 Commentators who look cynically upon China’s economic statecraft in the EU often 
highlight China’s propensity to work bilaterally with EU member states or develop its own sub-
regional fora, such as 16+1 format, instead of working directly with Brussels. It is undeniable 
that China has consistently prioritized bilateralism and shirked Brussels, but from the Chinese 
perspective this approach makes the most sense. On one hand China sees the EU as a slow-
paced decision-making body comprised of disparate national interests, and thus it is more 
effective to deal with member states on an individual basis.233 Plus, official China-EU summits 
have yielded increasingly unfavorable outcomes from a Chinese perspective; Brussels has 
become more critical in their rhetoric toward China in recent years and have pursued policies 
inimical to Chinese interests. On the other hand, China understands that it can use differences 
in member state priorities to achieve lowest common denominator outcomes that benefit 
China. As Parello-Plesner notes:  
“Even before the euro crisis, China knew how to employ the EU’s multi-level 
governance to its advantage based on differences between member states within the 
EU. For example, China knows that Southern European countries aren’t likely to be 
frontrunners on EU’s human rights policy, and that free-traders in the North, 
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spearheaded by the UK, Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden will work to block strong 
retaliatory moves on trade that smack of protectionism.”234 
 
In essence, China recognizes the expediency of working with EU member states 
individually or in small groups rather than working directly with Brussels. Beijing is not blind to 
the fact that it may be sowing the seeds of greater disunity in the EU on a variety of political 
and economic issues. However, EU disunity on these issues is not an end unto itself per se, but 
rather a means to advance Beijing’s own interests, such as a greater investment access to the 
EU market and less pushback from the EU on salient political issues.  
Seen in this light, the challenge that Chinese OFDI poses for the EU is not a wholly new 
challenge. In fact, many of the EU’s allies and foes recognize that the EU is much stronger when 
negotiating as a united bloc and thus attempt to circumvent Brussels. The Trump 
administration has consistently floated the idea of negotiating bilateral trade agreements with 
individual member states, namely Germany, as a way to secure “better deals” for the US.235 An 
even more glaring example is Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline negotiations. Despite the new 
liquid natural gas pipeline being ardently opposed by a number of CEE member states as well as 
the former President of the European Council Donald Tusk, Russia has worked with supportive 
EU governments to push the project forward.236 Working with the whole bloc on Nord Stream 2 
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would be slow, and most likely unsuccessful, so Russia has chosen to work directly with a 
subset of willing member states.  
In some ways the challenge posed by Chinese OFDI is unique, given that China is an 
ascendant power with a mixed economy adept at leveraging its economic strength for greater 
geopolitical gain. But in another sense, the EU’s struggles to address China’s investment 
practices and its growing influence across the bloc is a challenge rooted in the EU’s institutional 
composition. The 27 member states that comprise the EU all face unique domestic 
macroeconomic conditions. Consequentially, each country has different economic priorities and 
weighs the pros and cons of Chinese OFDI differently. While Germany, a net exporter, may 
prioritize protecting its high-tech manufacturing industry and getting China to reciprocate 
market access, smaller countries recovering from economic crisis or struggling with persistent 
slow growth may see attracting foreign capital as their primary objective. Yet, despite these 
varied and often times competing economic interests, the biggest issues affecting the bloc 
require consensus. Thus, the influx of Chinese OFDI in the EU is a complex, multidimensional 
phenomenon. It is at once a savior for floundering EU countries and companies, a tool of 
Beijing’s economic statecraft, a challenge for Brussels bureaucrats, and above all else, a 
reminder of the EU’s institutional limitations.  
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